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INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES OF THE
U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
by
JONATHAN L. MEZRICH*
INTRODUCTION
An Industry Under Siege
Under every new administration, some industries thrive, while others are victim-
ized. The government's treatment of the pharmaceutical industry is no exception. In the
past decade there has been a 180 degree switch in policy with regard to the treatment of
the ethical drug manufacturing industry, moving from unusual favoritism during the
Reagan administration, to President Clinton's use of the pharmaceutical industry as a.
scapegoat for much of America's health care cost problems.
History of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry
In the 1930s, merely a handful of proven medicinal drugs existed, and these were
sold without a prescription.1 None of these drugs were discovered through scientific
research methodology or an understanding of disease processes. However, the climate
changed drasticallyjust before World War II. Vitamins and hormones were discovered
and marketed, wiping out several illnesses and paving the foundation for modem sys-
tematic research.2 The development of penicillin in England in 1940 further refined
research and development (R & D) processes.3 But the real instigation of the pharma-
ceutical industry occurred during World War II, and was due to the U.S. government's
spending of almost $3 million to subsidize wartime penicillin research and manufactur-
ing.4 This led to the creation of numerous federal medicine plants which were later sold
to private firms at half price.5 Further, the granting of U.S. patents for medicinal com-
pounds in 1948 secured monopoly treatment for those companies willing to invest in
novel pharmaceutical product research." Rapidly, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
became a multinational force in the 1950s. But as the industry grew, international
competition also grew, and R & D expenditures, required to remain at the top of the
* Jonathan L. Mezrich, J.D. is a member of the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia bars. He is a graduate of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, and has recently received an LLM. degree in Taxation at the Georgetown
University Law Center in Washington, D.C.
I PHARMACEUnCAL PANEL, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMA-
CEUTICAL INDUSTRY 8 (1983).
2 Id. at 8-9.
SId. at 9.
4 Id.
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I d.
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industry increased accordingly. Thus, as with many post-World War II industries,
the U.S. held an early lead on worldwide-sale market share, but began to lose
ground to Japanese and European manufacturers throughout the 1970s.7
Heading for Disaster in the Early 1980s
In "The Competitive Status of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry," a government
study on the drug industry conducted by the Committee onTechnology and International
Economic and Trade Issues, it was noted that the U.S. was losing ground in market share
and research percentage, and it was projected that the U.S. would suffer in the wake of
fast rising U. K., Japanese and German manufacturers, unless some government action
was taken.
An overview of these trends indicates a marked drop for the U.S. presence in
world pharmaceutical markets around 1960, followed by stability in the
U.S. share ofnew drug introductions and sales... In contrast, the U.S. share
of R & D expenditures and drugs entering clinical trials... has continued
to decline, strongly suggesting an eventual further decline in U.S. shares of
introductions, sales and exports.8
The study proposed changes in patenting drugs, FDA regulation, and tax incentives to
get this industry back on track.9
In light of studies such as this, under the Reagan presidency, the government enacted
a variety of tax measures, as well as patent term extension legislation. Under this
Republican administration, the U.S. saw the creation of such pro-pharmaceutical leg-
islation as The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, and The Orphan Drug Act of 1983.
The 1990s -A Change in Perspective
By 1991, the pharmaceutical industry had rehabilitated itself (from a position bor-
dering on competitive disadvantage), but U.S. government opinion had now swung to
the other extreme. Politicians from the left, under the leadership of Congressmen such
7 See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, AND POLICY
OPTIONS 1-2 (1976). "American preeminence persisted, though in attenuated degree, through the 1960s. In the past
decade, however, the competitive advantage of American firms has been not only reduced but apparently eliminated."
PHARMACEUTICAL PANEL, supra note 1, at 7.
* Id. at 4.
9 Id. at 4-5.
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as Senator David Pryor, chairman of the Senate's Special Committee on Aging, began
a vendetta-like assault on the drg industry."°
" he Drug Manufacturing Industry: A Prescription for Profits," the staff report of
the Senate Special Committee on Aging, was issued in September, 1991. Backed by
Senate Committee Chairman David Pryor, it faults the pharmaceutical industry for
making profits beyond the consumerprice index, taking advantage of U.S. tax incentives
forR & D, charging foreign consumers less for prescription drugs than the same drugs
ae selling in the U. S., and exploiting the § 936 Possessions Tax CrediL Pryor believes
that because the government has given certain advantages to the drug industry, the
industry now owes the American people cheap medicine.
We give drug manufacturers FDA approval for drugs, then a patent from
anywhere between 8 and 10 years, which allows them to charge monopoly
prices for their drugs. Then we given them millions of dollars in research
credits each year to find the cures for the diseases of our time. Then we
underwrite the cost of research and development through billions of dollars
in federally funded NIH grants. Not satisfied with this, then we turn around
and give them hundreds of millions of dollars in tax deductions to market
and to advertise their products. To top it all off,... we give them billions
1o Sen. David Pryor has not made any pretense about his hostility toward pharmaceutical manufacturers. "Simple
'greed' explains why drug manufacturers raised their prices six times the rate of inflation between 1980 and 1992"
remarked Senator Ptyor. Norm Brewer, Study Accuses Drug Industry of Price Gouging, Gannett News Serv., Feb.
3. 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS file. Further, Senator Pryor "recently joked that pharmaceutical
industry lobbyists shouldn't schedule their vacations during the first 100 days of 1993." Viveca Novak, The Other
Drug Lords: When the Pharmaceutical Industry Comes Calling, Congress Listens, COMMON CAUSE MAO., July-
Sept. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CCAUSE File. Pryor also threatened that "[11f that (LR.C. § 936
amendment) doesn't work, we're going to have to teach the industry that God doesn't grant patents, government
does." Michael Unger, The Other Drug War: Congress Members Consumers Join to Fight the High Cost of
Prescription Drugs, NEWSDAY (Nassaw ed.), Oct. 4, 1992, Business section, at 88.
It is somewhat hard to understand the zealous crusade of this Arkansas Senator, which he has maintained since
the early 1980s, despite all pharmaceutical bill proposals he has sponsored to date being soundly defeated in the U.S.
Senate. "'I believe that the drug industry is more feared than respected by Congress,' says Pryor, a perpetual foe."
Novak, supra. It is feared that with the election of friend President Clinton, Piyor's position will now have newfound
legitimacy. See OfThree Arkansas Pals anda Raccoon Roast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,1993, § 1,at 1. "SenatorPryor
will have considerable influence in shaping health care policy... Mrs. Clinton thinks the world of him." Pharma-
ceuticals: Clinton and Pryor Target Drug Industry, Health Line, February 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library. HLTLNE File (quoting clinton political strategist James Carville). The LIRC. § 936 amendments contained
in the Omnibus Budget Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 demonstrate that Pryor has already begun to exert
considerable influence.
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of dollars in section 936 tax breaks in Puerto Rico, to go to Puerto Rico and
manufacture the drugs that we use in America."
In the 1991 report, Pryor outlined some of the changes he would like enacted.
Among the Senate Committee on Aging Report's suggestions to tax policy regulation
were:
1. Cut the § 936 credit for companies derivingprofits inexcess ofthe consumer price
index, and give the savings to a Federal Prescription Drug Trust fund to meet targeted
Medicare needs;
2. Require the Treasury Department to report to Congress on any tax incentives
given to the pharmaceutical industry and give assessments on the appropriateness of how
such incentives are being used; and
3. Require theTreasury Department and Departmentof Health and Human Services
(HHS) to jointly set up a program to ensure that tax credits are used for actual product
R & D, and not manufacturers' market research. 12
Senator Pryor and others have proposed or intend to propose various forms of
government intervention in the pharmaceutical industry in the areas of Patent Term
Extension (to accelerate the availability of generic drugs), R & DTax Credit availability,
1 PryorAttacksPharmaceutieal ndustryTAX ANALYSTS TAX NOTES TODAY, May26,1992,available in LEXIS,
TAXANA Library, TNT File. Other critics have echoed similar concern that market pressures are not working, and
that the industry owes a debt to the public who supports it.
[C]ritics argue that the market for drugs is flawed - and give three main reasons why. The first
is that health-insurance companies stand between consumers and the services they use, so neither
patients nor doctors have the influence to bear down on drug prices. The second reason is that drug
finns take advantage of federally financed development - for example, through the National
Institutes of Health -without adequately reimbursing the taxpayer. Third, a federalprovision gives
tax credits to firms that set up manufacturing operations in United States possessions, notably Puerto
Rico. Drug makers are by far the biggest beneficiaries, which may save them as much as $2 billion
a year.
Drug Companies: Golden Pills, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1993 at 73-74.
Note, although this article's author has predicted, on the subject of patent-term extension, that unless pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers begin some form of industry-wide monitoring of prices of patent extended drugs, the government
may begin to regulate such drugs, it is still this author's position that internal industry regulation would be better than
a forced government price setting program. See Jonathan L Mezrich, The Patentability and Patent Term Extension
ofLifesaving Drugs: ADeadlyMistake, 74 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 77 (Feb. 1992). It should be fairly
obvious that we can not let drug prices be set by Congressmen who do not eve understand the concept of, let alone
the risks involved in, pharmaceutical research and development. "Perhaps the low point in a recent floor debate
occurred when one senator exclaimed: 'It is hard to believe that a company could charge so much for such a tiny pill.'
It is also hard to believe that such a tiny intellect serves in what is members call the world's greatest deliberative body."
Murray Weidenbaum, Congress Tampers with a Winner in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, LA. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1992, at D-2.
12 See STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 102d CONG., IST SESs., THE DRUG MANUFACIUJRING
INDUSTRY: A PRESCRIPTION FOR PROFrIS 17-18 (Comm. Print 1991).
[Vol. 10
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the Orphan Drug Act, a royalty provision to repay the government for government-
sponsored (NIH) research on new drugs, FDA regulations, and, most prominently, the
§ 936 Possessions Tax Credit." In a February 3, 1993 report by the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, entitled "Earning a Failing Grade: A Report Card on 1992 Drug
Manufacturer Price Inflation," Pryor noted that pharmaceutical inflation was approxi-
mately six times the overall U.S. inflation rate.14 He found that only 16% of the profit
was placed back into R & D, while 35 % was used for marketing and advertising efforts. I
He noted that drug prices in other industrialized countries, notably Canada, are substan-
tially lower.16 Pryor claimed that drug company profitability has been "excessive,"
topping the "Fortune 500" median profit level in 1992.17
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Position
Partially in response to rising price concerns and reports such as these, the President
of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), Gerald J. Mossinghoff, was
asked to appear before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee of Ways and
Means, on July 18,1991, to discuss the state ofthe pharmaceutical industry and its efforts
in international competitiveness. Mossinghoff emphasized the competitiveness of the
industry, and stressed how low U.S. prescription drug costs are as compared to total
health care costs; he also explained the need for high investment in R & D, and the risky
proposition of R & D spending." In light of international pressures on the industry,
13 See Novak, supra note 10. "Following this public flogging,prosecutors like Sen. David Pryor(D-Ark) will request
additional sentencing: still higher taxes, price controls and, indirectly, a government takeover of medical research."
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Perspective on Pharmaceuticals: A Health-Care Scapegoat Responds; Blaming Drug
Companies For All Our Ills Harms Research and Ignores the Cost-effectiveness of the Industry, LA. TIMES, Mar.
9, 1993, at B7. See also Senators Push Federal Curbs on Drug Prices, CHI. TRiM., Feb. 3, 1993, at C-i; Jacqueline
Frank, Focus - US. Senators Seek Action on High Drug Prices. Reuters, Feb. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, FINRPT File.
" Drugs,DrugIndustryInflationHigherthan OverallRate, StudyFinds, Daily Report for Executives, Feb. 4,1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. DREXEC File [hereinafter Drug Industry Inflation]; supra note 10.
'" Drug Industry Inflation, supra note 14. While the marketing expense is high, it is likely a "Catch 22" if the
company does not extensively advertise, it will not sell as many products as its competitors, and hence, will not be
able tolowerprices appreciably (due to low volume of sales). On the otherhand, that 35% profit investedin marketing
has become, like R&D costs, a fixed cost of competitiveness, and thus limits the ultimate possibilities for lowering
prices. Although advertising clearly generates increased profits (orit would notbe expended),it creates a higherbase-
cost-per-unit below which the price will not be dropped. Yet clearly a suggestion that the 35% profit would be better
spentin loweringthe price ofthe drugs,is uninspired; ifa pharmaceutical company does not keep up with competitors'
advertising efforts, it will lose volume of sales (as drugs tend not to be sold well "word of mouth"), and will thus
ultimately need to raise its prices to keep the same level of profits (minus the 35%) previously enjoyed. While it's
likely that the market forces have been adequately dictating what percentage of profits economically should be
expended on marketing, the only real solution to this advertising cost dilemma could be some form of legislative
advertising. Such regulation is generally not desirable to the business community, would create enforcement prob-
lems, and would wreak havoc for companies competing internationally.
16 Id.
17 Id.
" Gerald J. MossinghoffPharmaceutlicalManuacturersAssociationPresident Testifies on International Competi-
tiveness, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Int'l, July 24,1991, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TNI File.
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Mossinghoff surmised that for the pharmaceutical industry to remain at its current level
of competitiveness:
(1) Stable tax policy is essential to enable U.S. companies to undertake the
long-range planning and investment that is the foundation of technological
innovation. Thus the 34% maximum corporate rate, established in 1986,
must be maintained. Other countries reduced their rates in response to our
reduction, and it would be short-sighted and counter-productive were we
now to turn around and increase the U.S. rate;19
(2) It is important to establish a permanent credit for increased research expenses;
(3) It is also important to establish a permanent system of allocation of domestic R &
D to U.S. and foreign source income (rather than successive moratoria which provide
no assurance of permanence and make long-range planning impossible);
(4) Mossinghoff suggested that some form oftax incentive be givento stimulate domes-
tic R & D, noting that "other industrialized countries do not penalize their multinationals
- our competitors;'"
(5) The § 936 Possessions Tax Credit must be maintained - as the U.S. tends to be
disadvantaged in developing countries, as the U.S. does not allow companies to take
advantage of "tax sparing" agreements;
These 'tax sparing' agreements enable foreign-based companies to operate
with much lower costs than U.S. firms in these emerging markets. The one
exception to this U.S. policy is Section 936... which provides a credit for
U.S. companies against U.S. taxes on the profits from manufacturing facili-
ties in Puerto Rico;21
(6) The FDA drug approval process needs to be streamlined;
(7) The country should increase levels of intellectual-property and patent protection; '
11 Id. It appears that President Clinton's recent tax increase thus may cause concern for this industry.
" Id. The PMA probably goes too far in suggesting that the government is penalizing the industry by not giving
drg companies additional incentives. However, the general theme, that the industry may need additional incentives
in order to maintain their competitiveness may be correct.
1 Id. See discussion of tax sparing infra p. 31.
22 Id.
U. S. tax policies need to be improved to encourage research and development and to ensure that
our tax policies are as favorable to the foreign operations of U. S. multinational corporations as are
the tax policies of other govenmients to the foreign operations of their multinational corporations. Phar-
ma al mm wnies from otheroounies are inceasing therinvestments in .search nddevelopment
and intensifying the competition. Many governments around the world have policies that are
inimicaltotheantinuinginvestmentby theU.S. pharmaceutical companies in research and development.
[Vol. 10
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Mossinghoff has also challenged the accuracy of Senator Pryor's February 1992
report, noting, "[tihe price date of which the Senator bases his charges are list - or
'sticker'- prices, before deducting discounts, rebates, or other negotiated reductions.
... Discounts and rebates reduce what customers actually pay for pharmaceuticals.123
Clinton's Health Care Debacle
Just prior to his State of the Union address in which he unveiled his new tax
proposals, President Clinton criticized the Drug Industry for the charging of prohibitive
prices on prescription drugs, particularly targeting vaccine administration for govern-
ment intervention, and he alleged that this industry was making profits at the expense of
the nation's children.' To be fair, however, the drug industry is not at all the force of evil
that certain government representatives would have us believe. Despite the poor odds
of such an R & D intensive venture as drug research, the pharmaceutical industry has
created one of the U.S.'s most recession-proof industries. Few U.S. industries have
enjoyed the international prominence of the pharmaceutical industry. "Of the 97 new
drugs that were introduced in world markets between 1975 and 1989, the United States
was the source of47 - almost half. We also have more major drugs in the pipeline than
any other country in the world.' It is also clear that if President Clinton intends to
significantly increase U.S. jobs, this industry is not the one to tamper with. "While
manufacturing companies as a whole averaged a 2% decline in employment during the
decade 1980 to 1990, the drug manufacturers increased their job forces by 24%."
Further, in their zeal to offer cheaper medicine to their constituents, politicians tend to
" Drug Industry Inflation, supra note 14. See also Constance Sommer, Senate Panel Assails Drug Price Boosts;
Pharmaceuticals: Leaders Call for More Regulation, Citing a Report That Some Industry Hikes Far Outpaced
Inflation, LA. TIMES, Feb. 4,1993, at D2. Mossinghoff has "accused Pryor of distorting the figures by looking only
at outpatient drug sales, by focusing on prices of select drugs rather than each finn's complete line, and by ignoring
discounts and rebates on listprices." PricesonPrescriptionDrugs Climbing FasterthanInflation, Senate Panel Told,
MINNEAPOLIS SrAR TRM.,Feb. 4,1993, at 18A. Mossinghoff noted that drug prices "slowed dramatically"in 1992,
dropping to 5.7% from 9.4% in 1991. Id. Another accounting describes the 1992 drug price inflation rate as 6.4%,
noting "[c]onsumer prices rose at less than half that rate last year." Senators Push Federal Curb On Drug Prices,
QI. TRIB., Feb. 3,1993. at Cl. While this "twice the CPI" figure is still a bit discouraging, it is certainly better than
Pryor's misleading "six times the CPI" figure.
u Richard L. Berke, President Assails "Shocking" Prices of Drug Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, § I, at 1.
See also"Nowhere has Mr. Clinton's rhetoric been so caustic as in his anacks on the terrified pharmaceuticalindustry
forits alleged gouging of consumers. The president has accused vaccine makers of earning 'unconscionable' profits
at the expense of America's children." Drug Companies: Golden Pills, supra note 11, at 74.
" Weidenbaum, supra note l1,atD2.
I d. "Investors recognize something Mr. Clinton evidently has not: practically every new job created since the
recession in 1990 has come from this vibrant industry." Drug Companies: Golden Pills, supra note 11, at 74. "If
Mr. Clinton's thinking on trade and industrial policy makes sense, this is an odd industry to single out forpunishmenL"
Id. In the recent months, the painful effects of Clinton's drug industry plans have already become obvious. "Phar-
maceutical industry layoffs totaled 3,240 in August compared to 2,400 in July. Johnson & Johnson amounced 3,000
and Advanced Technology announced 240." 400,000 in 8 months! Layoffs Surge Past '91 Recession Pace, Business
Wire, Sept. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. "In the pharmaceutical industry, Johnson &
Johnson, Merck & Co., and Marion Merrell Dow Inc. this yearjoined a growing listof companies thathave announced
work foree reductions that run into the thousands." ChristineShenot, Health-Care JobPicture Muddied byLayoffs,
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forget that companies that manufacture pharmaceuticals do so as a business, and set their
prices based on market forces, not greed.27
In fact, several companies, in an effort to appease the government and forestall
intervention, have been voluntarily reducing their prices to some extent.,, Yet it is not
clear that Clinton's plan to lower the cost of health care by causing the pharmaceutical
industry to forego profits, will be particularly effective. First, phannaceutical costs
account for only a small percentage of the total health care bill, and so even forcing the
drug industry to offer drugs below the inflation rate would do little to make a dent in the
Debate in WashingtonINVwsroRS BUSINESS DAILY,Aug. 27,1993, at2. See also U.S.LayoffsSweepPast350,000,
PRNewswire,Aug. 6,1993; U.S.DrugsGianttoAxe 3,000, DAILYTELEGRAPH,Aug. 13,1993,at 18; Briefly: Health
Care, LA. TIMES, Aug. 12,1993, at D2;JohnsonandJohnsonAnnouncesRestricting Plans, CNN Moneyline, Aug.
11, 1993.
" "'These companies are not charities - they are charging what the market will allow them to charge,' said Sam
Peltzman, a professor of economics at the University of Chicago." Elisabeth Rosenthal, Exploring the Murky World
ofDrug Prices, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, § 4, at3. Peltzman furtherobserved that"[i]f you tie the price ofthedrug
to the cost of developing just the product, you miss the essence of pharmaceutical development, where nine out of
ten products fail." Id.; Clearly, in the short rm, drugs would be cheaper if drug price inflation was tied to the overall
U. S inflation rate. Drugs, Consumers Could Save if Prices Are Linked to Inflation, Study Says, Daily Report for
Executives, Feb. 12,1993,available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File. But this assumes that drg companies
are able to stay competitive internationally, continue to find new products with substantially reduced R&D dollars,
and remain located in the U. S. As this article will discuss,it is more likely that companies will either move overseas,
or get out of the pharmaceutical business, if such limiting price controls are enacted.
2 See Ronald Begley, Pricing Pressure from Congress, CHEM. WEEK, Aug. 12, 1992, at 26. "Pharmaceutical
companies are responding to a pounding from Congress on the issue of big drug price increases and record-selling
profits by trying harder to hold the line on year-to-year price increases." Id. In fact, Merck and Company, a firm
explicitly assailed by President Clinton, had been holding their profits to the inflation rate since 1990. See Drug
Industry: The Other Side of the Pricing Argument, Health Line, Feb. 19,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis library,
HLTLNE File; see also Gail Fitzer-Schiller, Merck andCo. Strikes Backat Clinton, Reuters, Feb. 19,1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FINRPT File. "[Pfizer, Inc. Pharmaceutical vice chairman Edward] Bessey said most
pharmaceutical companies including Pfizer, have committed publicly to holding price increases below the rate of
inflation." Pfizer Offers Free Drugs to Uninsured, Reuter Bus. Report. Aug. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
ibrary, OMNI File. See also Janel L Fix, Pfizer Offers Free Medicine to Uninsured, USA TODAY, Aug. 16,1993,
money section, at IB; Pfizer, Inc., has also recently begun a"Sharing the Care" Program to provide several of its top-
selling drugs to uninsured indigent Americans, as a showing of the drug industry good will.
On September 15, 1993, Senator Pryor proposed a plan where prescription drug manufacturers would be asked
to sign a voluntary agreement to curb drug prices. Health Care, White House Says It Supports Voluntary Drug Price
Controls, Daily Report for Executives, Sept. 17,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis ibrary, DREXEC File. See also
David Olmos, Biotech Firms See Clinton Plan as Bitter Medicine; Health Care: Cutting-Edge Companies Fear
Advent of Government Price Controls Will Strangle Industry. Proponents of Plan Say They are Crying Wolf, LA.
TIMES,Sept. 18,1993,atD-1. If aprescription drug's priceincreases fasterthanthe rate ofinflation, themanufacturer
would be subject to government imposed penalties. Id. But there are other impediments to this type of drug industry
cooperation. A Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association price lowering plan was recently rejected on October 1,
1993, not by the drug industrialists, but by the U. S. Department of Justice - as it was determined to be illegal under
the antitrust laws. Albert Crenshaw, Plan to Curb Drug Prices Is Rejected; Justice Calls Link to Inflation Illegal,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2,1993, at Cl. "This administration is committed to making health care affordable and available
to allAmericans but antitrust laws cannotbe violated in the process." Id. atC6 (statementofassistantAttorney General
Anne K. Bingaman).
[Vol. 10
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skyrocketing U.S. health costs.29 Further, arguments can be made that today's high
pharmaceutical costs still actually save money, because a good medicine tends to keep
patients out of hospitals or eliminate the need for surgery or other therapies which may
cost much more than even the most expensive drug? Finally, President Clinton's attack
on vaccine manufacturer's exploitative price increases contained some misinformation.
President Clinton claimed that in the 1980s, vaccine prices rose from $23 to more than
$200.1 However, he neglected to note that"... 80% of those price increases were for
added protections, including a federal excise tax to compensate injured children,32 two
additional vaccines for meningitis and hepatitis B,33 and added doses to boost immunity
levels."'
This article will attempt to illustrate the recent tax issues in the pharmaceutical
industry, now the "scapegoat" of the nation's health care problems, which have interna-
tional effects; it will also defend the necessity of research credits and other tax incentives
for this recently revived industry. Finally, it will attempt to evaluate the concerns raised
by Gerald Mossinghoff of the PMA in his testimony before Congress.
Industry representatives have estimated that prescription pharmaceuticals represent only 5-7% of the U.S. Health
Care bill "Prescription drugs account for less than 7 cents of every health care dollar." Drug Industry: The Other
Side of the Pricing Argwnent, Health Line, Feb. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Libray, HLTLNE File.
"Prescription drugs, though only 5 cents of the health-care dollar, are the most cost-effective nickel we spend."
Daniels, supra note 13, at B7. Curiously, many Congressmen fail to appreciate the relative insignificance of phar-
maceuticals to health care costs. "A good way to cut medical bills is to reduce the cost of prescription drugs."
Competitive Problems in the Pharmaceutical Drug Industry: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Monopoly, and Business Rights ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) (Opening
statement of Senator Metzenbaum). It should be noted that the U. S. Senate Special Committee on Aging's view is
that in 1990, "over 10 percent of all health care expenditures in the United States - about $67 billion - were for
prescription drugs." STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING 102d CONG., 2D SESS., A STATUS REPORT:
ACCEssimnrY AND AFIVRDABIuTY OF PRESCRuPION DRUGS FOR OuER AMERICANS, vii (Comm. Print
1992). While a 10% cost (if accurate) is a little more significant, it is still a small puddle in the pond.
"e Daniels, supra note 13, at B7. See also Mossinghoff, 91 supra note 18. "Medicines not only save lives - they
save money. Medicines are the most ost-effective form of medical therapy because they help to reduce the cost of
alternative, more expensive forms of medical care, such as surgery or hospitalization." Id.
31 End to Tax Credit for Some Drug Makers Urged, LA. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A12.
n See I. R. C. § 9510 (1988), Vaccine Injury compensation Trust Fund, which supports U.S. Claims Court awards
under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U. S. C. 300aa-10, et seq. (1988).
" Now required in addition to the three standard childhood vaccinations of DPT (Diphtheria, Pertussis, Tetanus),
MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella), and Polio.
31 End to Tax Credit for Some Drug Makers Urged, supra note 31, at A12. See also Karen Riley, Measure Would
Halt Drug Firm Windfall, WASH. TIMS, Feb. 16, 1993, at B-4. Berke, supranote 24, § 1, at 1.
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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The Life-blood of the Industry
The pharmaceutical industry is unique in the degree it depends on research and
development expenditures to remain competitive.3 Indeed such investment in R & D
is a risky proposition, as a pharmaceutical corporation may take years to recoup its
investment, if at all. Still, with the aid of several credits and deductions for research
and experimentation, the drug industry has been able to overcome this cost barrier, and
has shown a profit well in excess of the consumer price index in recent years.37 It appears
likely that the quantity of research and development done by this industry is directly
related to the high U.S. market share of pharmaceutical sales worldwide.8 This being
so, adjustments in research deductions and credits, and decisions affecting allocation
and apportionment of R & D expenses, have profound effects on the international
competitiveness of the ethical drug industry 9 Additionally, certain allocation treat-
ments of R & D expenditures may influence U.S. corporate decisions as to whether to
locate R & D operations domestically or overseas °
R & D Deductions and Credits
Under § 174 of the Code, taxpayers may treat their worldwide R & D expenses as
a current deduction in the yearpaid, ormay amortize the expenses over aperiod ofat least
5 years.41 The election to currently deduct or amortize is to be made in the first taxable
ss "Research is the foundation of competitive strength for modem pharmaceutical finns." The Competitive Status
of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 1, at 23.
"6 "Drug research is probably the riskiest economic venture we know; only one of 5,000 possibilities researched ever
becomes a marketed product." Daniels, supra note 13, at B7. But cf. DONALD DRAKE & MARIAN UHLMAN,
MAKING MEDiCINE, MAKING MONEY 67 (1993), in which the authors concede that it costs an average of $231
million for each new drug to be brought to market, but contend that brand-name manufacturers are able to minimize
R&D risks and capitalize on others efforts to reap high profits at the expense of consumers.
" See THE DRUG MANUFACTURER'S INDUSMTY: A PRESCRIPTION FOR PROFrrS,supra note 12. "Drug companies
undertake these massive searches knowing them will be a big payoff if they hit a winner ... We can have lower drug
prices if we accept less of that searching. That's the choice we face." Elisabeth Rosenthal, Research, Promotion and
Profits: Spotlight is on the Drug Industry, N.Y. Tbms Feb. 21, 1993, § 1, at 1. Note: while the drug industry proved
profitable even beforethe granting of various research credits and incentives, the industry is farmore sensitive to world
competition than other corporate investments. This is due to the inherent risk and expense of R&D. For instance, with
a little capital and a lot of luck, a European or Japanese corporation could develop a drug that would quickly cut into
the U. S world-sales market share; Conversely, a U. S. corporation expending billions on R&D could fail to recoup
their investment and end up bankrupt.
a See generally GRAOWSmI, supra note 7.
See William R. Peck, U.S. TaxPolicy Concerning Research andDevelopment in the Multinational Conext INT'L
TAX J., Winter 1990, at 68.
o See Arthur Andersen study, discussed infra p. 18.
" See Peck, supra note 39, at 70.
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year, and does not require obtaining consent from the IRS.V 2 To qualify under § 174,
R&D must be reasonably incurred in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business,
and must qualify as activities which are experimental in nature43 Specifically, market
research and other non-scientific research expenditures are excluded." Worldwide
R&D expenses of multinational corporations deductible under § 174 must be allocated
between U.S. and foreign source income."
There is also an "incremental" R & D credit under § 41. This gives qualifying
taxpayers a credit for 20% of a taxpayer's incremental increase in R & D expenses from
prior years above a statutorily calculated, taxpayer specific, base amount." This was
created in order to stimulate increases in existing R & D activity. Although many
companies may qualify for both the § 174 and § 41 incentives, § 280C(c) prevents
overlap between the R & D credit (§ 41) and the deduction (§ 174).Y
4 I.R.C. § 174(a)(2)(A) (1988); See also INT'L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTAION, TAx TREATMENT OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELoPMENT EXPENSES 145 (1988).
Peck, supra note 39, at 71.
" Id.Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (1993) provides:
The term "research and experimental expenditures." as used in section 174, means expenditures
incurred in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business which represent research and develop-
ment costs in the experimental or laboratory sense. The term includes generally all such costs
incident tothe development of an experimental or pilot model, a plant process, a product, a formula,
an invention or similar property, and the improvement of already existing property of the type
mentioned. The term does not include expenditures such as those for the ordinary testing or
inspection of materials or products for quality control orthose for efficiency surveys, management
studies, consumer surveys, advertising, or promotions.
Id.
45 See I.IC. § 864(f) (1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e) (1992); discussed infra p. 17; Peck, supra note 39, at 71.
"Id.; The 20% figure has been reduced from the original 25% allowance. The base amount is generally the average
amount of the taxpayer's qualified expenses over the past three year period. INT'L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMEN-
TAION, supra note 42. I.R.C. § 41 (c) (1993) requires the minimum base amount to be 50% of the qualified research
expenses. I.R.C. § 41(d) (1988) somewhat limits the definition of R&D of § 174 to the more technologically
significant R&D.
"Section 280C(c) requires taxpayers either to reduce the [§ 174] deduction by 100 percent of their [§ 41] credit,
orto reduce the credit by the product of the U. S. corporate tax rate and their section 41 credit." Peck, supra note 39,
at 74. I.R.C. § 280C(c)(1) (West 1993) thus provides either that "No deduction shall be allowed for that portion of
the qualified research expenses... or basic research expenses... otherwise allowable as a deduction for the taxable
year which is equal to the amount of the credit determined for such taxable year... Or the taxpayer may elect that
"[tlhe amount ofcredit determined under this subparagraph for any taxable year shall be the amount equal to the excess
of - (i) the amount of credit determined under section 41(a)... over (ii) the product of - (1) the amount described
in clause (i), and (11) the maximum rate of tax under Section Io(b)(1)," L R. C. § 280C(c)(3)(B) (West 1993). While
both §174 and §41 are meant to be incentives to encourage domestic research, some critics question their present
utility. See generally William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research and Development: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 76 GEO. L. 1.347 (1987).
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Allocation of Research and Development
Section 901 of the Code allows taxpayers a foreign tax credit against their U.S. taxes,
for foreign taxes paid on foreign source income.4 The U.S. taxes its citizens on their
worldwide income, while foreign jurisdictions will typically tax U.S. citizens only on
income derived within their borders. Hence, foreign created income may be subject to
tax in two jurisdictions. The goal of the § 901 foreign tax credit is thus to eliminate this
double taxation of U.S. persons and achieve some semblance of export neutrality49
Because of the credit scheme set out in § 901, it is important to industry that R & D
expenses are allocated in such a way that a domestic corporation may best use this credit.
Typically, adomestic corporation will want as muchofthose R & Dexpenses which were
actually spent in the U.S., to be allocated to the United States. This is because a U.S.
corporation may be subject to increased tax if a foreign country disallows an R & D
expense deduction for U.S. located R & D that is allocated to foreign source income.10
The § 904 limitation is specifically what accounts for the discrepancy. In simple
terms, forthelargestU.S. corporations the § 904 foreigntax creditlimitationis calculated
by multiplying the corporate rate (now 35%) times the corporation's foreign source
income."' If the Internal Revenue Service allocates more research expenses to the
foreign source, this will decrease foreign source income, and hence decrease the foreign
tax credit limitation.52 In such a situation, a company with excess foreign tax credits
would pay more tax than if the R & D was allocated to U.S. source income.
For example: Corporation A, a large multinational drug manufacturer, has a $200
U.S. tax liability, pays $100 of foreign taxes, has excess foreign tax credits, and has $10
of R & D expenses. If that $10 is sourced domestically, Corporation A will pay $190 of
U.S. taxes, plus $65 [$100 - 35 (tax credit limitation of $100 x 35%)] of foreign income,
or $255.
However, if the $10 expense is sourced to the foreign source, it will reduce the
foreign source income, and hence the foreign tax credit limitation, so Corporation A
s LR.C. § 901 (a) (1988) provides that "the tax imposed by this chapter shall, subject to the limitation of section 904,
be credited with the amounts provided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b) ... " I.R.C. § 901(b) (1988)
provides that "Subject to the limitation in section 904, the following amounts shall be allowed as the credit under
subsection (a): ... any income, warprofits, and excess profits tax paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign
country or to any possession of the United States.. ." Section 904(a) contains the limitation of use of such a credit
only to the US tax rate imposed on the taxpayer's foreign-source income, and states:
The total amount of the credit taken under section 901(a) shall not exceed the same proportion of
the tax against which such credit is taken which the taxpayer's taxable income from sources without
the United States (but not in excess of the taxpayer's entire taxable income) bears to his entire taxable
income for the same taxable year.
I.R.C. § 904(a) (1988).
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would owe $200 of U.S. taxes, plus $68.50 [$100 - (90 x 35%), the foreign tax actually
paid minus the limitation = 31.50], or $268.40. It should be obvious that, if one is talking
in terms of millions of dollars, with a much higher percentage of R & D expenditures,
this could easily be significant.
Thus, unless a foreign country allows some corresponding form of deduction for
expenses which the U.S. Treasury Department allocates to foreign source income, the
U.S. corporation will pay "double" taxes on some portion of its income; these overall tax
costs may arguably be a disincentive to locating R & D-intense operations in the U.S.53
It should be noted that the discrepancy caused by the § 904 limitation only applies
to corporations with excess foreign tax credits.m A company may have excess foreign
tax credits if currently or in a previous year (1) foreign corporate tax rates are higher
49 In effect, by allowing a foreign tax credit, the U.S. is ceding its right to tax income earned in a foreign jurisdiction.
Peck, supra note 39, at 69.
-t IcHAELJ. MCINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RUiES OFTHE UNTED STATES, 3-62(1989). See
Treasury Department Report on its Impact of Research and Development Regulation, Daily Report for Executives,
June 16, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File (hereinafter Treas. Dept. R&D Report). The
Treasury Department report notes that the Code defines the foreign tax credit limitation as:
Maximum allowable foreign tax credit = tentative U.S. tax on worldwide taxable income X
foreipn source taxable income = tentative US tax on worldwide taxable income
worldwide taxable income worldwide taxable income
X foreign source taxable income,
and "since the reduced corporate rates [example uses 1983 corporate tax rate of 46%] for U.S.
taxpayers with $100,000 or less of taxable income are probably not significant for most multina-
tional corporations, the limitation canbe thoughtof as: 46%X foreign source taxable income. Thus,
the allowable foreign tax credit is the less of the U.S. or foreign taxes on foreign source taxable
income."
Id.
* Note - This decreases the foreign source income as far as the Treasury Department is concerned. However, if
a foreign country does not allow a corresponding deduction, such a deemed decrease will work against a taxpayer
as it decreases the limitation without decreasing the taxes owed.
53 Someforeign countries allow deductions forresearch costs only whenthe research workis donelocally. Thus
the regulations sometimes reduce foreign source taxable income for costs that do not reduce the amounts
taxed by foreign countries. This incongruence between U.S. and foreign rules may cause the foreign tax
credit limitation to be less than the rates imposed by foreign countries, even when U.S. and foreign rates are
similar. As a result, some have argued, U.S. companies are encouraged to shift portions of their research
activities to foreign countries in order to bring foreign tax liabilities more in line with the foreign tax credit
limitation.
3 BORis L BnrITER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATE, AND GVT, at 70-48 (3d
ed. 1991).
I Treasury Dept. R&D report, supra note 51. "In other words, the tax rates of the foreign country must be higher
than those of the United States. If foreign tax rates are lower than U.S. rates, the R&D deduction problem disappears
fortwo reasons. First, the foreign tax credit will wipe out the entire foreign tax anyway. Second, albeit superfluously,
who cares if the foreign jurisdiction denies deductions if it wasn't taxing very much in the first place?' Joel S.
Newman, Research and Development Allocates Under Sections 861 and 864: An Author's Query, 60 TAX NOTES
641,642 (Aug. 2, 1993).
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than the U.S.; (2) U.S. and foreign sourcing rules overlap; (3) there is a difference
between the U.S. and foreign expense allocation rules; or (4) there is a difference in the
timing of the reporting of income or deductions.55 It should be pointed out that such
concerns may not be an issue for the several countries with which the U.S. has a bilateral
income tax treaty providing forreasonable deductions forresearch expenses with respect
to business profits.56
Because of the high tax costs involved and the need for advance tax planning,
corporations which do a large portion of their R & D domestically have continually
pushed for a permanently codified allocation system which would allow them to appor-
tion most, if not all, of their U.S.-based R & D expenditures to U.S. source income 57 In
many cases, it is not clear whether such a scheme would be any further from reflecting
economic reality than the Treasury's harsher regulations, discussed below.
There is not necessarily one 'right way' to allocate expenses to foreign
income in some situations. It is particularly difficult to allocate expenses
"Peck, supra note 39, at 69.
Excess foreign tax credits result when the amount of foreign creditable income taxes paid or
accrued in a given year exceeds the taxpayer's foreign tax credit limitation... Excess credits can
also arise for a variety of other reasons, all of which involve the limitation. Differences between the
income-sourcing rules of the United States (whose rules are generally consistent with international
norms generally recognized by developing countries) and those of other countries may result in U.
S. treatment of income taxed by anothercountry as domestic income forpurposes of the foreign tax
credit. Timing differences in the reporting of income and deductions underU. S. and foreign tax laws
may result in a taxpayer's being unable to utilize some foreign tax credits in a year in which income
is reported in a foreign country but not in the United States. Domestic losses may reduce worldwide
taxable income and pre-credit U.S. tax, and, hence, the amount of foreign tax credits thatcan be used
currently. Perhaps most importantly, effective corporate income tax rates in many industrialized
countries are higher than U. S. income tax rates.
Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Pamphlet Selling Out Background on Research and Experimentation Expense
SourceAllocation Rules, Considered at House ways andMeans Oversight Subcommittee Hearing October26,1983,
Daily Report for Executives, Oct. 16, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File (hereinafter Tax
Pamphlet).
" Peck, supra note 39, at 70.
7 The government should also consider permitting research and development expenditures incurred
in the United States to be allocated solely to the U.S. income of the taxpayer. Treasury regulations
recently issued to implement Sec. 1.861-8 of the Internal Revenue Code require that R&D expen-
ditures be apportioned to both foreign source and domestic income in an effort to recognize that fact
that innovations in the United States often result in licensing and other revenue from foreign sources.
However the effects of the regulations are (1) to apportion expenses to foreign source income even
when that income is incidental to the innovation; (2) to result in double taxation because foreign
governments do not allow this allocation to be taken into account when figuring taxes due them; (3)
to encourage the location of R&D facilities abroad instead of at home to escape the effects of the
regulations, thereby dimishing both the amount of R&D conducted in the United States and, in the
long term, the tax revenue generated from its conduct. Recent changes in tax law have provided
temporary reprieve from these Treasury regulations. Consideration could be given to making the
reprieve permanent.
THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF ThE U.S. PHARMACEUICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 80-81.
[Vol. 10
14
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 10 [1993], Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol10/iss1/7
1nIERNATIONAL TAX IssuEs
in the case of R & D because expenses often cannot be related directly to
any income. Even ifR & D expenses can be related directly to income, that
income is often generated years after the research is conducted.58
Additionally, while it would indeed by frustrating for the Treasury to lose revenue on
U.S. related income by allowing it to be offset by expenses more properly linked to
foreign sources, at least erring in the taxpayer's favor here would be an incentive which
may translate into additional competitiveness of U.S. based R & D intensive industry,
and an incentive towards research investment.
The Treasury Regulations -§1.861-8(e)
In 1973, the Treasury Departnent issued a first attempt to codify rules for allocation
of research expenditures which was highly criticized for its overzealous allocation
percentage to foreign source income.59 So in 1977 the treasury Departmentmade another
attempt, issuing the present regulations, found in § 1.861-8(e).60 The goal was to allow
an accurate allocation of R & D expenses to U.S. and foreign source income, but not
permit the R & D expended on products sold overseas to be used to offset domestic
income. In effect, the Treasury sought to tie the R & D costs to the jurisdiction where
related income was generated. Before any allocation is made, the regulations provide
for R & D expenses undertaken solely to satisfy a legal requirement of a political entity,
where the results cannot be reasonably expected to generate additional amounts of
income outside that geographic source, to be allocated to thatjurisdiction.61 The regu-
lations provided for use of either a sales method or gross income method.
1. The Sales Method - §1.861-8(e)(3)(ii)
The sales method provides for a portion (30% after 1979) of the deduction to be
allocated exclusively to the country in which the R & D is considered performed, 62 and
theremainderistobe splitbetweenU.S. and foreign sources inproportiontothe taxpayer's
sales of goods and services within the product category.63
s Tax Panmet, supra note 55.
5 Id.
I d.
" Tress. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)(i)(B) (1992). The regulations state that an example of this would be that costs of a
test required to satisfy U.S. Food and Drug Administration requirements, where the test is not required elsewhere and
is not expected to generate income elsewhere, may be allocated to U.S. source income. Id. This assumes that there
often will be no economic advantage to foreign sales by virtue of having a proven "safe" product.
o Tres. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)(ii)(A) (1992).
" Treas. Reg. § L.861-8(e)(3)(ii)(B) (1992).
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R & D is considered performed in the country where activities accounting forgreater
than 50% of the R & D costs are done.6 The exclusive allocation (of 30%61 to the source
where at least 50% of the R & D is done) is required because the regulations note that
R & D tends to be most valuable in the location where it is performed, as new products
tend to be sold in the nearest market first, and local research tends to benefit a broader
base of products in local markets (as only certain items are selected for overseas market-
ing)." Allocations are done based on sales within relevant product categories.6 A
treatise by Professors Bittker and Lokken offers a good illustration of the application of
the sales method:
Assume a domestic corporation's deduction for research costs fora particu-
laryearis $100, $30 of which is allocated exclusively to U.S. source income
because the United States is the situs of the research; within the product
category in which the research is done, the corporation has sales revenues
for the year of $1,000 including $600 yielding gross income from U.S.
sources and $400 producing foreign source income. The portion of the
research deduction taken in determining foreign source taxable income is
$28 ($70 times $400/$ 1000). The amount assigned to U.S. source income
is $72 ($30 under the exclusive allocation rule and $70 times $600/$1,000
under the sales apportionment nile)."
" Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)(ii)(A) (1992); If there is sufficient split so that no one country has greater than 50%,
the entire amount will be allocated by sales.
"s While under the regulations, the exclusive portion is normally 30%, the taxpayer can use a larger portion if the
research and development is "reasonably expected to have very limited or long delayed application outside the
geographic source where it was performed." Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)(ii)(A) (1992). "The delayed application
concept proved especially beneficial to taxpayers that retained vital secret processes in the United States for signifi-
cant periods of time." Jon E. Bischell, Deduction and Allocation ofResearch and Development Expenditures: The
Final Chapter or Just Another Installment? 16 INT'L TAX J. 225, 228 (Summer 1990).
Id.
BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 70-52. The term "product category" refers to the classification of products
enumerated in the STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION (SIC) MANUAL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF TIE PRESI-
DENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (1972); Treas Reg. § 1.861-8(e)O)(i)(A) (1992).
" BIlTIER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 70-52. The Treasury Department offers a similarly simple example:
To illustrate the sales method, assume that a corporation performs $100 of R&D in the
United States and has its sales divided evenly (50-50) between the United States and foreign
markets. In this case, $30 would be 'exclusively.apportioned' to the United States and the
remaining $70 in R&D expenses would be apportioned equally between domestic and foreign
source income, $35 to each source.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRASURY, THE IMPACT OF THE SECTION 861-8 REGULATION ON U.S. RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT (June 16, 1983), available in LEXMS, Nexis Library, TAXANA File.
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2. The Gross Income Method - 1.861-8(e)(3)(iii)
An alternative to the sales method provided in the regulations is the gross income
method. Under this method, the R & D expenses are apportioned ratably, based on the
taxpayer's gross income.6 However, the allocated amount must be at least 50% of what
would have been allocated under a sales method. Bittker and Lokken illustrate:
Assume a domestic corporation's allocation of its deduction for research
and development costs under the sales method would be 40 percent to the
statutory grouping (gross income from foreign sources) and 60 percent to
the residual grouping, whereas a strict apportionment by gross income
would assign only 10 percent to the statutory grouping. If the taxpayer
elects the gross income method under the regulations, the statutory group-
ing is allocated 20 percent of the deduction (one half of the apportionment
under the sales method), and the other 80 percent goes to the residual
grouping. °
3. The Controversy Surrounding the 1977 Regulations
Industry was far from satisfied with theTreasury's system ofR & D allocation. Due
to lobbying pressures, Congress overrode this method with a series of 8 temporary
moratoria.7' The problems Congress was trying to correct were two-fold:
1. That such allocation hurts U.S.-located companies' competitiveness abroad. The
U.S. regulations on R & D match domestic corporations' R & D with foreign source
income when sales are made, or gross income acquired, in foreign countries, even if all
the costs were incurred in the U.S. However, many foreign countries only allow
deductions for R & D performed locally. This discrepancy was hurting some U.S.
companies abroad, as the regulations would reduce the foreign source income for costs
that did not reduce the amounts taxed in foreign countries. The incongruence between
the U.S. and foreign rules made the foreign tax credit limitation less than the taxes
imposed in foreign countries (even where the tax rates were the same);
2. It encourages U.S. companies to move R & D facilities abroad, as was considered
in the following two studies:
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)('ii) (1992).
'0 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 70-53.
' In fact, of the 16 years since the Treasury regulations were enacted, they have been applied in fewer than five.
R&D, TEl Urges RevisedR&D Allocation Rule, Asks Treasury to ExtendMoratorium, Daily Report for Executives,
May 7,1992, available in LEXlS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File.
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4. The Arthur Andersen study I
Following the first two year moratoria in 1981, created by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA), which allowed a 100% allocation of U.S. R & D to domestic source
income, the Treasury Department began a study on the effect of the research allocation
on American manufacturing firms and how they structured their businesses, the efficacy
of the ERTA, and whether the § 1.861-8 regulations created an incentive to relocate
operations to foreign jurisdictions.73 Concerned that this anticipated 1982 report on
R&D from the Treasury Department would greatly underestimate the volume of activi-
ties transferred abroad as a result of the R & D allocation regulations, four industry
associations commissioned the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen to generate an in-
dependent report on the effects of ERTA and the § 1.861-8 regulations.74 The report was
intended to be used as a companion effort to the upcoming Treasury Department study.7 5
Arthur Andersen's study consisted of surveys sent to 325 multinational firms rep-
resenting 85% of all U.S. R & D activity, which asked questions on "foreign tax laws,
the nature of the foreign government, availability of funding and raw materials, regula-
tory considerations, the political climate, labor costs, geographic location, and foreign
interest rates." The study was ultimately completed based on responses to such surveys
received by 85 of the largest corporations, having aggregate sales of approximately $400
billion, collectively more than 3.5 million employees, and collective total R & D expen-
ditures in excess of 12 billion dollars.77
The ultimate (albeit poorly supported) finding of the accounting finn's study was
that the § 1.861-8 regulations in fact did encourage U.S. firms to move R & D invest-
ments to operations abroad, and "that R & D investment in foreign markets by U.S.
companies is increasing faster than in U.S. markets." ' The report also noted that a
significant number of survey respondents suggested that creation of a permanent credit
based on the generous model of the ERTA moratorium would reverse the trend and be
"an important step in rebuilding technological superiority in U.S. industry and in revers-
SARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., NATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STUDY (January 1983).
73 Firms Favor Making 1981 Rules Permanent to Halt ExpandedActivity Abroad, Survey Finds, Daily Report for
Executives, Jan. 31,1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File (hereinafter Firms Favor Making 1981
Rules Permanent).
14 R&D: Industry Commissions Own Analysis on Effects of Cost Allocation Tax Rules, FED. CONT. REP., March
29, 1982 at A8. The four industry groups commissioning the study were the Electronics industries Association, the
National Association of Manufacturers, the Emergency Committee on American Trade, and the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers' Association.
75 Id.
76 Id.
" Firms Favor Making 1981 Rules Permanent, supra note 73.
73 Tax Pamphlet, supra note 55.
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ing the trends evidenced in this study."79 However, tax considerations were found to be
just one of many factors companies considered in determining the location of R & D
efforts, and the Treasury Department was quick to minimize the importance of this
study.' It is also not clear how much weight ought to be given to this study based on its
partisan genesis.81
" FirmsFavorMaking 1981RulesPermanentsupra note 73 (quotingArthurAndersen study). Theprimary findings
of the study were:
* The research and development allocation requirements of Section 861 increase the overall tax
liability of U.S. multinational corporations by generally placing finns in an excess foreign tax credit
position.
* Survey respondents considered the pre- 1981 tax act rules as a disincentive to domestic conduct
of research and experimentation. Specifically Section 861 was singled outas a detriment todomestic
R&D operations by 'a significant group.'
* The U.S. is the only nation requiring the allocation of domestic R&D expenditures. In fact,
other developed nations have instituted various incentives to attract and stimulate R&D activities
within their borders.
* Management most frequently reviews R&D decisions in light of long-term competitiveness or
is influenced by factors leading to a favorable R&D environment. Characteristics such as a suffi-
cient supply of skilled manpower, adequate R&D facilities, and various government incentives or
disincentives play a significant role in these decisions.
* Most corporations have shown an increase in their foreign R&D expenditures as a percentage
of their worldwide R&D expenditures over the past 10 years...
* The percentage increase in respondents' foreign-to-total R&D exceeded the percentage change
in the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, meaning that R&D investment occurred independently
of expanding operations (measured by sales). A significant reallocation of R&D abroad took place
over the 10-year period studied.
* The growth on a percentage basis of respondents' foreign-to-total R&D manpower confirms
the shift of R&D abroad. Employment of highly skilled scientists and engineering professionals
increased faster abroad than in the U.S.
* Most respondents believe that lifting the moratorium will encourage an expansion of foreign
R&D investments in the future."
ARTHUR ANDERSON & CO., supra note 72.
See also Study Cites Need to Make 1981 Tax Rule Permanent to Encourage More R&D in US, INT'L TRADE
REPORTER'S U.S. IMPoRT WKLY., Mar. 2,1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTRAD File.
The relatively modest role of tax factors in determining the location of R&D appears tobe supported
by a recentstudy by Arthur Andersen and Co.... The study reports, that] the results indicate that
the most common incentive for determining timing, placement, and scope of R&D projects is the
competency of the available work force. The geographical location of necessary raw materials and
research data was the second most frequent response.
Treas. Dept. R&D Report, supra note 51. "While the Arthur Andersen study finds that taxes have some influence on
the location of R&D investment, this factor is not of primary importance to the finns included in the study," Tax
Pamphlet, supra note 55.
"t Other organizations have subsequently commissioned their own studies on R&D allocation under § 1.861-8. On
April 3, 1987, the Council on Research and Technology (CORETECH), an interest group made up of public policy,
research, and educational institutions, issued a study as a lobbying tool to bolster their claim of the necessity for an
increased permanent R&D credit. Coretech Study Hails R&D; Calls for Additional Incentives and the Restoration
ofR&D TaxCreditTaxAnalysts Tax Notes IntemationalApr. 15.1987,available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TNI File.
'"[The study] convincingly.., demonstrates that the Treasury regulations under § 1.861-8 are both unfair and unwise
-that any tax revenue derived will come dollar-for-dollar out of a reduction in U.S. R&D spending - and that the
wrong solution tothe 861 problem will encourage more U.S. R&D to go abroad." Id. (quoting CORETECH Counsel
Stuart Eizenstat).
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5. The Treasury Department Study 2
Based on Congressional mandate,83 the Treasury Department performed a study of
R & D allocation, the 1977 regulations, and ERTA. The analysis the Treasury Depart-
ment used is fairly complicated. The Treasury based its study on information taken off
theirForm 1118 ('Computation of Foreign Tax Credit -Corporations') computer files."
They used this information to determine which U.S. companies were in excess foreign
tax credit positions, and made adjustments to the sampling of companies for expected
IRS audit adjustments.' They then used this information to estimate an average excess
foreign tax credit position per industry. 6 The end result was thus an audit adjusted excess
credit index.8 The Treasury then used a 1977 U.S. Commerce Department benchmark
survey as industry information on R & D spending and domestic and foreign sales; with
this they projected theR & Ddatato 1982, based onthe growth oftotal industry-financed
R & D." The Treasury Department then made a preliminary estimate of an average
company's R & D allocation to foreign income by industry, calculated the resultant
increase in U.S. tax liabilities, and adjusted the results for §482 cost-sharing adjustments,
and actual R & D allocation information made available on SEC documentation. 89
Finally, the Treasury Department also considered the impact on R & D intensive firms,
and the possibility of additional companies becoming excess foreign credit companies
by virtue of the R & D allocations.90
The Treasury Department concluded that
[i]f the Regulation's R & D rules had been in effect in 1982, instead of the
ERTA moratorium, the U.S. tax liabilities of U.S. firms would have been
$100 million to $240 million higher. Since privately-funded R & D per-
formed in the United States was about 37 billion in 1982, the estimated
increase in U.S. tax liabilities represents an increase in the cost of privately-
financed U.S. R & D of between .27 and .65 percent, or, less than 1.0
percent.91
2 Treas. Dept. R&D Report, supra note 51.
" The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, P.L. No. 97-34,95 Stat. 172, (1981); "In the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA) the Congress directed the Treasury Department to study the impact of the R&D rules of Treasury
Regulation Sec. 1.861-8 on research activities conducted in the United States and on the availability of the foreign
tax credit," Tax Pamphlet, supra note 55.
H Id.
Is Id.
Id.
B Id.
" Id. (citing U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1977,
Washington, D.C. 1971).
8 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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The Treasury, based on these results, suspected that the end result would be a reduction
ofdomesticR& D spending. 2 However, theTreasury believed that the reductionof U.S.
R & D expenditures would not be accompanied by an increased investment in foreign
R & D, due to prohibitive start-up costs in foreign jurisdictions; the need for economies
of scale from centralized R & D in the U.S. (for U.S. companies); and the need for
industries' R & D facilities to be coupled with their manufacturing operations. 3 "Based
on these considerations, it appears that foreign R & D is nothighly substitutable for R&D
performed in the United States.""
TheTreasury's study, while negatingthe theory that greater foreignR & Dallocation
mandates movement ofR & D facilities abroad, concluded that, "[tihe Treasury Depart-
ment recognizes that the reduction in R & D may adversely affect the competitive
position of the United States. Accordingly, the Treasury supports a two-year extension
of the present moratorium."
The I.R.C. Temporary Solution: § 864(t)
In 1989, as part of the codification of the Technical and Miscellaneous RevenueAct
of 1982 (TAMRA), Congress enacted § 864(f).96 Section 864(f) first provided that if R
& D is done only to meetlegal requirements of one location (and not expected to generate
income elsewhere), that research is allocated to that location.97 For all other R & D, if
the research was attributable to U.S. activities, then 64% of expenses were allocated to
the U.S. Conversely, if the research was attributable to foreign activities, then 64% were
allocated to the foreign jurisdiction."
The remaining 36% of R & D expenses were allocated on the basis of gross sales
orgross income as provided inthe § 1.861-8(e) regulations (but a gross income allocation
to foreign sources must have been at least 30% of what the gross sales deduction would
have been.)99
Rev. Proc. 92-56
Forthree years, from 1989-92, I.R.C. § 864(f) applied fortaxpayers. Following this,
the regulations were slated to go back into effect and provide for a typically lower U.S.
expense allocation, unless another statutory change or moratorium was enacted. In
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Peck, supra note 39, at79.
I.R.C. § 864(f)(IXA) (West 1993). As in the regulations, this would allow research to satisfy FDA requirements
to be allocated wholly to U.S. source income.
9 IMR.C. § 864(f)(1)(B) (West 1993).
LR.C. § 864(f)(IXC) (West 1993).
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response to Congressional concern over the impending sunset of § 864(f), the Treasury
Department was pressured into enacting Revenue Procedure 92-56.10 This procedure
stated thatfor 18 months (from theJune 30,1992 expirationof § 864(f) (forcalendaryear
taxpayers) until the end of 1993), taxpayers, at their option may apply either § 864(f) or
the § 1.861-8(e) regulations, while the Treasury Department considers the proper appor-
tionment issue." 1 While pharmaceutical company advocates have always pushed for a
permanent R & D allocation system, few industrialists object to the § 864(0 and Rev.
Proc. 92-56 U.S.-source allocation percentages, in light of the harsher 1977 Regulation
altermative.1o2
Additionally, Revenue Procedure 92-69 was enacted to give guidance in applying
92-56 in light of possible § 936 overlap. Revenue Procedure 92-69 states that if the §
936(h) election is in effect, expenses covered by the § 936 credit should not be double
counted in allocating under 92-56.103
These Revenue Procedures were enacted by the Treasury Department, and not
Congress, and so the $915,000,000 "given away" was not subject to the 1990 Budget
agreement. 4 This bypass was engineered by then Senate Finance Committee Chair-
man, Lloyd Bentsen, Daniel Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee and the U.S. Department of the Treasury.' Many find it questionable for
these officials to have given such a tax break to research intensive corporations without
looking to Congressional Budget restraints.'os
The Relationship Between § 86409, the § 1.861-8(e) Regulations, and §§ 174 and 41
The above Revenue Procedure (92-56) tabled one issue still inthe air- that the § 861
regulations create a disincentive to U.S. R & D, while the basic purpose of §§ 174 and
'e David S. Hilzenrath, Wriggling Out ofBudget Constraints; TaxBreakManeuverShowsBentsen's Skill in Evading
1990 Pact, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at Al.
0 Rev. Proc. 92-56, 1992-28, I.R.B. 7.
", Yet critics feel that:
[a] permanent solution to the controversy would end the ongoing uncertainty in the area and put the
United States in a position to compete with other industrialized countries in encouraging domestic
research and development activity. Given the fact that foreigners file almost one-half of the patent
applications received by the U.S. Patent Office, a permanent solution and encouragement to U.S.
based R&D activities cannot come soon enough.
Bischell, supra note 65 at 230.
Im Rev. Proc. 92-69, 1992-36, .R.B. 18; See discussion of § 936, infra p. 25,
101 Hilzenrathsupra note 100,atAl.
Id.
WI Id. "The cost of the tax break will add directly to the budget deficit because the govemment did not have to find
a way to pay forit." Id. Further, it is possible that 92-56 will have a greater impact on the deficit than would simply
a reenactment of § 864(f), as it allows those few taxpayers who can betterusethe 1977 regulations the option toachieve
a better tax result. R&D Businesses Say IRS Allocation Procedure Acknowledges Regulatory Solution is Apt, Daily
Report for Executives, July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, DREXEC File.
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41, which are intended to create incentives to further R & D investment, is subverted.
Some critics have argued that § 174 says R & D in the U.S. is deductible, but the § 861
regulations imply that if a company is competitive internationally, it won't get much of
a U.S. deduction, as the IRS will allocate much of its expenses to foreign sources10w It
would be prudent for the government to decide whether their goal is truly to encourage
R & D, or simply to increase revenue intake, and legislate accordingly.
President Clinton's Proposed Offshore R & D Credit Plan
In February of 1993, President Clinton proposed a tax package which would modify
the R & D allocation rules, effective December 31, 1993 .11 The proposal would allocate
100% of R & D expenses to the place of performance °9 But as a trade-off, the plan
would provide that all foreign source royalty income would be subject to the separate
foreign tax credit limitation for passive income. °10
Under § 904(d), separate (basket) limitations are kept track of in addition to the
general foreign tax credit limitation. Among these is a passive foreign tax credit limi-
tation."' Thus, under President Clinton's proposal, the passive foreign tax credit limi-
tation would have included: royalties received from an unrelated person in the conduct
of an active trade orbusiness, and certain royalties received from foreign affiliates which
are currently categorized in the Code on a "look-through" basis - royalties previously
treated as general-limitation-type income."' The Treasury described the effects of this
proposal as: "The proposal would eliminate the existing tax preference for licensing
intangible property for use in foreign production activities. In addition, the rules gov-
erning the allocation of R & E would be simplified and would encourage the conduct of
R & E in the United States.""'
o Letterof Raymond J. Wiacek, Lawyer Examines Problems with the Tax Treatment ofForeign R&D. Tax Analysts
Tax Notes Int'l, June 3.1992, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TIM File.
I have to tell you that I have never been able to convince any businessman preparing for a meeting
with the Treasury or Congressional representatives that section 174 and the section 861 regulations
arenotintemally inconsistent. The reply to my technical explanation is always: 'section 174 permits
and inuces my company to deduct its R&D, at the same time that the section 861 regulations effectively
deny my company the deduction just because it competes internationally in high tax jurisdictions.
The section 861 regulations are, therefore, a clear disincentive which negate section 174.
Id.
Im See William J. Clinton, Clinon's Economic Plan Report "A Vision of Changefor America" Tax Analysts Tax
Notes Int'l, Feb. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TNI File.
'0 Treasury Officialy Releiases Explanation ofClinton Tax Package, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Today, Feb. 26,1993,
available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TNI File.
110 Id.
,I.R.C. § 904(d)(1XA) (1988).
" Treasury Officially Releases Explanation of Clinton Tax Package, supra note 109.
IJ d.
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But it was soon apparent that this royalty "give-up" was a steeper price than com-
panies were willing to pay for a fu U.S.-source allocation ofR & D. Because itwas clear
that the Treasury Department was the real winner of this proposal, it had already gen-
erated considerable protest.t 4 The widespread criticisms of this plan apparently did not
"I See, eg., McClure Objects to Proposal on Foreign-Source Royalties, TaxAnalysts Tax Notes Int'l, April 9,1993,
available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TM File; Foreign Royalty Income: Response to Treasury Briefing Paper,
Tax Analysts Tax Notes Int'l, May 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TI File; Catherine Hubbard,
Clinton'sRoyaltyProposal wouldDiscourage Research Spending, Economist Predicts, TaxAnalysts Tax Notes Int'l,
May 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TNI File; Business, Practitioner Groups Speak Out Against
Clinton's Foreign Royalties Plan, Daily Report for Executives, May 3.1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis library,
DREXEC File;. Attorney Attacks Proposal to Treat Foreign-Source Royalties as Passive Income, Tax Analysts Tax
Notes Int'l, April 9,1993, available in LEXIS. TAXANA library, TNI File. The Committee on Royalty Taxation
(CORI), a multinational-business coalition, made a compelling presentation to Congress as to what they view as the
flawed approach of theproposed plan. DexterF.BakerRoyaltyCommitee'sTestimonyatW&MHearingonClinton's
Economic Proposals, Including Foreign Provisions, Tax Notes Int'l, Apdl 5,1993, available in LEXISTAXANA
Library, TNI File. They believed that Clinton's proposal was unfair and unsound, and would result in a reduction of
U.S. based R&D, investment, and jobs.
U.S. multinational companies affected by the proposal are an important source of high-wage,
high -skill domestic jobs .... It seems incongruous to the Administration's stated goals of reducing
the deficit, promoting high quality domestic jobs, and promoting U.S. based R&D, to single out for
a massive tax increase those corporations that provide such jobs and conduct significant levels of
R&D in the United States.
Id.
CORT's attack on Clinton's plan was three-fold. First, CORT disputes the President's unfairly penalizing com-
panies with foreign plants, noting,
U.S. multinationals with royalty arrangements invest overseas to expand into and service new
foreign markets, not to replace U.S. jobs. Given a choice, U.S. multinationals with royalty arrange-
ments most often choose to produce their products in the U.S. However ... these companies often
do not have that choice. Too often, a U.S. company seeking to break into a foreign market must
choose between producing a product or providing a service locally or foregoing that market entirely.
Id.
CORT also disputed the claim that the President's solutions are the proper way to reconcile R&D deductions with
appropriate U.S. source income, noting,
The 64 percent allocation rule already represents the best efforts of many people over numerous
years and after lengthy debate to formulate the extent that U.S. based R&E gives rise to foreign
source income. Accordingly, no compensatory 'recapture' of R&E deductions is required. More-
over, if the Treasury wishes to reopen the R&E allocation debate, it should do so independently of
the characterization of royalty income for foreign tax credit purposes.
Id.
Finally, they questioned the Treasury's rationale as to proper sourcing of royalty income:
It has been rumored that some Treasury officials reportedly believe that royalties should be
sourced where the underlying intangibles are created, not where they are used. Such a change would
represent a radical shift in U.S. international tax policy and would create havoc with our treaty
partners.. . If Treasury truly believes that royalties should be sourced where the intangibles are
developed, it should repeal the 30 percent withholding tax for the use of intangibles developed in
other taxing jurisdictions. Since it has not proposed to do so. this rationale sounds more like an
afterthought than a consistently applied view of proper tax policy.
Id.
Twenty-six members of the House Ways and Means Committee also separately sent letters to Clinton's Secretary
of Treasury, Lloyd Bentsen, Clinton'sProposedSection 936 Changes Will Not Hurt PuertoRico, TreasurySays, Daily
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fall on deaf ears, and the version of the Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993
which was actually enacted did not include these passive basket limitation royalty
provisions.
The Latest Installment: R & D Allocation Under OBRA '93
The Omnibus Budget Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993,115 temporarily adopted
an allocation scheme similar to 864(f) for a period of one year following the last year in
which Rev. Proc. 92-56 applied to the taxpayer.116 However, instead of automatically
allocating 64% of expenses attributable to either U.S. or foreign activities to that source,
the new law uses a 50% allocation. (i.e. 50% of expenses attributable to U.S. activities
is allocated to U.S. source income, with the remaining 50% allocated onthe basis of gross
sales or gross income; 50% of expenses attributable to activities conducted outside the
U.S. is allocated to foreign source income with the remaining 50% allocated on the basis
of gross sales or gross income.)' 7 While this allocation scheme is not as detrimental to
the drug industry as the plan originally proposed by the White House, the short-term
duration of this temporary act will do nothing to eliminate planning uncertainty,"' and
the lowerpercentage of expenses initially allocated to U.S. sources may prove expensive
to the industry.
§ 936 POSSESSIONS TAX ISSUES
One of the most lucrative tax incentives given to the pharmaceutical industry is the
§ 936 Possession Tax Credit. Although not specifically designed for the benefit of drug
companies, as much as 56% of this credit has historically been used by U.S. phannaceu-
Report for Executives, April 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. The Committee members
believed that the proposal could hurt U.S. corporations' competitiveness due to higher tax burdens on their foreign
operations, and actually could lead to increased reinvestment of income abroad, rather than domestically. Ways and
Means Members Express Concern Over Clinton's International Tax Proposals, Tax Notes Int'l, April 30, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. The letter explained:
One of the fundamental decisions made in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to permit companies
to treat their active business operations as a unit for foreign tax credit purposes. The ability to
"basket" different types of active business income together encourages companies to repatriate
(through dividends) foreign source earnings. Those dividends carry with them the taxes paid on the
underlying foreign earnings and, absent a cross crediting mechanism, their repatriation could have
a significantlyincreased U.S. tax cost Thus,if the royalties proposal were enacted,it would be more
cost efficient in many cases for U.S. companies to reinvest those earnings in productive activities
abroad rather than in the United States.
Id.
10 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L No. 103-66 (enacted August 10, 1993).
16 A TaxBill Baedeker, A Guide to the 1993 Tax Laws, 60 TAX NOTES 811, 871 (Aug. 12, 1993).
"I LR.C. § 864(f)(1)(B) (as amended by the 1993 Act, § 13234(a)); The RIA Complete Analysis of the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993 at 234-6.
I" "Congress's failure to provide a permanent solution to the issue is a disappointment, and many commentators
attribute the decision to provide another temporary fix to Congress's reluctance to address the revenue costs of a
permanent solution.", John Tlurro, U.S. Enacts Controversial Budget Legislation, Tax Notes Int'l, Aug. 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TAXANA File.
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tical corporations.1t 9 This is because drug company R & D investment typically leads
to valuable intangible property, which is easy to transfer to U.S. possessions such as
Puerto Rico. SenatorPryorhas repeatedly attempted to remove what he has termed, this
"mother of all tax breaks" from the pharmaceutical industry.12
Much of the ammunition of Senators opposing the § 936 credit comes from a series
of government studies culminating with a May 1992 Government Accounting Office
(GAO) study,"' and an Office ofTechnology (OTA) report issued on February 25,1993.
The GAO study stated that a total of 26 drug companies were able to save $8.5 million
in federal and local taxes in the 1980s. 122 Itis also noted thatdrug manufacturers received
$70,788 in tax credits per Puerto Rican employee hired (in 1987), while the average
wages paid to employees was only about $26,500.13 Drug lobbyists dispute the value
of this study by noting that it fails to note that the drug companies have provided 115,000jobs on the island, and that the per job figure does not account for non-pharmaceutical
jobs that were indirectly generated by Puerto Rican investment."
The OTAstudy, purporting to use the pharmaceutical industry's own data, noted that
in the decade of 1976-87, pharmaceutical companies generated 2-3% greater economic
returns than corporations in other industries, after adjusting for risk differences."z The
study also found that drug companies had an after-tax surplus return of approximately
4.3% of the price of each new drug over its product life; this was approximately $36
million more than was required to recoup its R & D investment.'2 The PMA contests
the 4.3% profit surplus figure, by claiming the OTA used a 46% tax rate for R & D
expenditures and a 32% rate for related income generated, thereby drastically underes-
timating the industry's tax liability and inflating the net profit.1 7 The PMA claims the
same tax rate should have been used for costs and revenues, which would have signifi-
cantly reduced the percentage. 2
119 Sec. 936 Tax Credit Revision Is Goalfor 103rd Congress Ways and Means Chairman Rostenkowski Says; PMA
'Strongly Opposes' Bill's Proposed 15% Reduction in Tax, The Pink Sheet 1992; 54(30): 9-10, July 27, 1992.
I" TaxCode isNot ToolForFidngDrugPrices, Senate Finance ChairmanBentsenIndicatesInArgumentsAgainst
Pryor Plan; Hatch and Bradley Join Opposition, The Pink Sheet 19924 54(11): 5-7, Mar. 16, 1992.
ul Tax Benefitsfor the Pharmaceutical Industry, 138 CONG. REC. S.6632.102d Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. May 14,
1992) (statement of Sen. Pryor).
m Id. at S.6641; MiltFreudenheim, BusinessandHealth: Trying toCurbPrice ofDrugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,1992,
at D2.
in Freudenheim, supra note 122.
124 Id.; "They said the GAO analysis had omitted an estimated 4.7 additional jobs per employee, which the drg,,
makers said were indirectly supported by pharmaceutical industry spending." Milt Freudenheim, Tax Credits of $8.5
Billion Received by 22 Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at D3.
us Drugs, Drug Industry Reacts to OTA Report on Costs, Rewards of Pharmaceutical R&D. Daily Report for
Executives, Mar. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI Fde.
I" Id.
127 Id.
12B Id.
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The OTA report also found that pharmaceutical companies spend 22% of their total
sales on advertising and marketing, or approximately $10 billion, which Congressmen
are quick to note are dollars that could be used to reduce drug costs. 29 And the OTAnoted
that 58% of industry research is invested in "me too" drugs, which are drugs designed
to make a profit, but add little therapeutic benefit. 1°
The I.R.C. § 936 is a complicated rule which allows U.S. corporations operating in
Puerto Rico and other U.S. Possessions to receive a U.S. tax credit on income generated
from an active trade or business in the Possession.' With respect to intangible property
income, the credit is somewhat limited by § 936(h)(1)(A) which reallocates income from
patents and other intellectual property back to the U.S. corporate shareholders." How-
ever,
[m]any § 936 corporations can avoid the reallocation scheme by electing
to compute taxable income under a cost sharing or profit splitting method.
Under the cost sharing method, the corporation makes annual payments to
affiliated entities engaged in research and development activities in amounts
intended to reimburse these entities for the costs of research and develop-
ment that will ultimately benefit the § 936 corporation. The payments are
deductible by the corporation and therefore reduce the income qualifying
for the credit to amounts intended to represent a fair retum on the costs
incurred by the corporation itself. Under the profit split method, the com-
bined taxable income of the § 936 corporation and all affiliated businesses
from sales of goods and services produced by the corporation in a posses-
sion is split equally between the corporation and its affiliates.
The pharmaceutical industry generally has elected to use the profit split method "which
typically has the effect of exempting from Federal taxes half of the profits the companies
generate" in the possession.'3
I" News Conference with Rep. Henry Waxman, D-CA. Topic: Release of Office of Technology Assessment Report
on Cost and Profits of Pharmaceutical Research and Development, Fed. News Service, Feb. 25, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File.
I Id., Such drgs am to be used in addition to other medications, but do not represent a novel curative delement.
3 "In order to qualify for the section 936 credit, a domestic corporation must derive at least 75 percent of its gross
income from the active conduct of a trade or business within a possession over a three-year period, and at least 80
percent of the corporation's gross income must be derived from sources within a possession during that period."
Treasury Officially Releases Explanation of Clinton Tax Package, supra note 109.
'" BnTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 67-8. At one time, a U.S. company could simply conduct R&D in the
U.S., take a current § 174 deduction on the research expenses, and then transfer the resultant patent tax free (under
§351) to a Puerto Rican subsidiary. The company could then obtain §936 credits on profits from the sales of the Puerto
Rican subsidiary. Id. This practice was somewhat limited in 1982, and again in 1986. Id.
'Ild. at 67-9.
SLeah Beth Ward, The Offshore Threat To Pharmceuticals, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 3. at 5.
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Senator Pryor's original legislative proposal mandated limiting the § 936 credit to
the Consumer Price Index (i.e. drug profits tied to national inflation rates). His original
bill thus simply tied permissible profits directly to the consumer price index (CPI); this
was later modified to be a 20% credit reduction for each point above CPI. Pryor's bill,
The Prescription Drug Cost Containment Act of 1991,11 had little support from either
Republicans or Democrats, and was defeated in the Senate. 13
Pryor has recently taken a different tack, proposing that §936 be limited to employee
wages expended in the possession. In his 1993 bill,137 Pryor seeks to phase out the
existing credit over five years in favor of a wage-based credit. Pryor has maintained that
the § 936 credit has not appreciably been effective in creating jobs in Puerto Rico.38 To
remedy this, Pryor's plan would ultimately replace the current possessions credit with
a credit of 40% of the first $20,000 of qualified wages paid to workers in Puerto Rico." 9
During the five year phase-in, Pryor's bill would allow 100% of wages paid in the first
year, 85% in the second year, 70% in the third, 55% in the fourth, and finally 40% in the
fifth year.'40 The tax savings would be applied toward a 100% deduction for health care
insurance premiums for the self-employed. 41
It should be noted that Pryor's wage-based credit proposal is similar to an ill-fated
plan offered by PresidentRonald Reaganin 1985. In § 12.05 ofaReaganAdministration
plan entitled, 'The President's Proposals To the Congress for Fairness, Growth and
Simplicity," the then existing tax-free treatment under § 936 would have been replaced
by a wage credit worth 60% of an employee's salary at the minimum wage, plus 20%
of the amount paid, up to four times the minimum wage.142 This proposal was met with
I's S2000, 137 CONG. REC. S. 17291 (daily ed., Nov. 20, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Pryor).
Im Partnership With the People, 139 CONG. REc. S. 1221,1223 (daily ed. Jan. 5,1993) (statements of Sen. Pryor).
"The drug companies won that battle, but now we will be fighting on a different turf."
Possessions Wage CreditActof1993,139CONG. REC. S. 1593 (daily ed., Feb. 16,1993)(statementofSen. Pryor).
1 However it should be noted that a Price Waterhouse study "The Impact of a Complete Repeal of Section 936"
tends to disagree, and suggests that Pryor's proposal would have "devastating consequences for the Puerto Rican
Economy, including a loss of at least 70,000 jobs," and would result"in a deeper recession on the island than any the
United States has experienced in the post World War II period," Puerto Rican Economy Threatened by "Double -
Barreled Attack," Foundation Alleges, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Today, Mar. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, TNT File.
"' Swnmaries of Today's Important Tax Items, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Today, Feb. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library. TNT File.
" Id. John Turro,PryorBill WouldReplace Possessions Credit with Wage Credit, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Int'l, Feb.
18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TNI File.
"I Pryor Introduces Bill to Replace Sec. 936 Credit with Wage Credit, Daily Labor Report, Feb. 18.1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DLABRT File.
"2 Anne Swardson & Henry Boyd Hall, Puerto Rico Gains Ground in Tax-BreakLobbying, WASH. POST, July 12,
1985. at B3. PueitoRico's Governor Saysle Will WorklTo CurbAbuses in Effort To Salvage Section 936, TaxAnalysts
Tax Notes Int'l. June 12,1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TNI File. Puerto Rico -U.S.A. Foundation Fights
To Save Section 936, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Int'l, June 26,1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TNI File. The
ultimate result of the wage credit would equal a maximum of $5,062 per worker," Swardson and Hall, supra.
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intense Puerto Rican and U.S. corporate lobbying efforts, and was ultimately discarded
by the administration.143 While lobbyists were able to convince the government in 1985
that a wage-based credit would result in disastrous unemployment for Puerto Rico, it
does not appear that they have the same impact today.'"
President Clinton's § 936 Solution
PresidentClinton also proposed his ownlimitation ofthe § 936 creditinhisFebruary
1993 proposed tax package.14' The Clinton plan would have limited a company's § 936
tax credit to 65 % of compensation paid to possession employees.'" Clinton's plan noted
that current data on § 936 "suggests that while section 936 has created employment in
Puerto Rico, the number ofjobs created is too small in relation to the tax expenditure." 47
The Treasury had abstracted the effect of the President's proposal to be:
Possessions corporations thathave created arelativelylargenumberofjobs
will continue to enjoy the tax credit that they now receive. Possession
corporations for which tax credits exceed 65% of payrolls will lose some
of their tax benefits unless they expand their Puerto Rican employment.
The result should be a much more cost-effective possessions credit.'
§ 936 Under OBRA '93
In August, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993. Section 13227 of OBRA '93 now provides sever limitations on the use of the §
936 credit. A corporation may now obtain a § 936 credit limited to either
(1) 60% of qualified compensation incurred, plus a depreciation percentage of
tangible property used in the territory, plus (if not using a profit split method) a portion
of the possession income taxes, or,
(2) The corporation may use a 60% percentage of the § 936 credit that would have
been applicable under the pre-OBRA '93 rules; This percentage is to be phased back 5%
' Howard Gleckman,PuertoRico Head Says Tax BreakCurb Would Hurt Islands Economy, THE BOND BUYER
July 15, 1985 at 4; Study Hits Reagan Plan to Replace Possessions TaxBreak, Daily Report for Executives, June 18,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File. Repeal of Section 936 Credit Will Devastate Possessions'
Economies, Senate Finance Committee Told, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Int'l, Oct. 9, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, TNI File. International Provisions of Reagan Reform Plan Come UnderFire From US. Corporations, Int'l
Trade Reporter, July 17,1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTRAD File.
M See, e.g., a full-page advertisementWhereDothe3.6MillionAmericansLive WhoHaveBeenAskedToSacrifice
the Most By the U.S. Treasury? Puerto Rico, WASH. POST, April 27,1993, at C14.
'~ Treasury Officially Releases Explanation of Clinton Tax Package, supra note 109.
' Puerto Rican Economy Threatened by "Double-Barreled Attack!" Foundation Alleges. supra note 138.
"a Treasury Officially Releases Explanation of Clinton Tax Package, supra note 109.
143 Id.
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per year to 40% in 1998 and beyond. 49 Because, as mentioned above, the pharmaceu-
tical industry has generally found the profit split method most beneficial, it appears that
they will be limited to the latter § 936 limitation.15' The OBRA '93 provisions represent
a severe limitation to the use of the § 936 credit for industries such as pharmaceutical
manufacturing, and ae sure to have profound effects on the industry's competitiveness' 5'
Other § 936 Proposals
OnAugust4,1993, Congressman Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) proposed H.R. 2857, abill
to completely repeal § 936 from the Internal Revenue Code. 52 This extreme proposal
was probably tabled by the subsequent passing of § 936 provisions in OBRA '93.
However this bill may suggest that legislators are far from satisfied with the current tax
credit treatment of the pharmaceutical industry. Although not presently under consid-
eration, there have also been other proposals for revising the § 936 possessions tax credit.
Not long ago, House Ways and Means Chairman Daniel Rostenkowski proposed a
"Foreign Tax Rationalization and Simplification Bill."'' 5 Section 411 of that proposal
would have reduced the § 936 credit by 15%.1s Although the PMA opposed this
proposal as well, it is by far the most generous of the changes which have been proposed.
0 A Tax Bill Baedeker, A Guide to the 1993 Tax Law, supra note 116.
-0 See supra note 138.
A possession corporation that uses the economic-activity limitation to compute its Code Sec. 936
credit and which also uses the profit split method to allocate income from intangible property in a
tax year... is allowed to deduct a certain amount of possession income taxes for that year in
determining its U.S. income tax liability. The amount allowed as a deduction equals the possession
income taxes for that tax year multiplied by a fraction. The fraction consists of the possession
corporation's increased U.S. tax liability resulting from the economic-activity limitation divided by
the possession corporation's U.S. tax liability determined without the Code Sec. 936 credit. How-
ever, no deduction for possession income taxes is allowed in computing the Code Sec. 936 credit
or in determining the amount of possession income taxes that may be deducted
(The RIA Complete Analysis of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 at 264).
' In sum, for industries utilizing the §936 credit, "in 1994 they can choose to receive a tax credit for 60% of the
profits, falling to 40o% in 1998, or they may choose a wage-based credit equal to 60% of wages paid plus fringe benefits
up to 15% of the base wage. The wage credit is capped at $48,960 per employee. Companies are also eligible for
depreciation allowances ranging from 15-65%." What theNew TaxRegime Means, Lagniappe Letter, Aug. 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. "The final result was an estimated $3.8 billion over five years in
revenues from narrowing Section 936. It was less than the administration wanted, but about as much as business
would tolerate." Max Boot, Anatomy of a Budget Winner, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 12, 1993 at 2.
'M Cooper Bill, HR. 2857, Would Repeal Possessions Credit, Tax Notes Int'l Aug. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS,
TAXANA Library, TIM File.
m H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
t Sec. 936 Tax Credit Revision is Goalfor 103rd Congress, Ways & Means Chairman Rostenkowski Says; PMA
'Strongly Opposes'Bill's Proposed 15% Reduction in Tax, supra note 119; U.S., Foreign Multinationals Unlikely to
Support Foreign Tax Reform Bill, Daily Report for Executives, June 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
DREXEC File.
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Tax Sparing and § 936
One of the biggest reasons pharmaceutical industry advocates claim to need the §
936 credit is because it allows U.S. corporations to compete with other nations who take
advantage of "tax sparing."'l5 'Tax sparing" refers to the practice of one country allow-
ing its taxpayers to claim a foreign tax credit for a tax in another country not actually
paid.S6 "The purpose behind tax sparing is to allow a developing nation to offer
businesses a 'tax holiday' (e.g., freedom from taxes for a specified period of time) as an
investment incentive without the tax holiday benefit accruing to the developed nation."I
However, for policy reasons, the United States will not enter into treaties involving
tax sparing agreements. One reason is out of a general policy that a U.S. treaty should
not provide U.S. taxpayers with U.S. tax benefits as opposed to simply avoiding double
taxation. Another reason is that tax sparing agreements discriminate against companies
investing in the U.S. and encourage location of investment abroad."5
The U.S. "tax sparing" policy limits U.S. pharmaceutical industry competitiveness,
as it requires U.S. corporations to incur greater costs in developing markets in less
developed countries (L.D.C.s), who offer such tax holidays than do their European
counterpart firms. However, because of the tax haven treatment companies have been
getting in possessions such as Puerto Rico, they have still been able to maintain their
competitive advantage. Admittedly, the § 936 credit/tax sparing analogy is not a perfect
one. However, the point Mossinghoff and others appear to be making is that non-U.S.
pharmaceutical corporationsmay perform operations in tax sparing treaty countries and
save taxes, which may ultimately be passed on as a savings to their consumers.5 9
Similarly, use of a possessions corporation may generate similar savings via the § 936
credit. Critics claim that § 936 modifications may eliminate this trade equity, and force
U.S. companies to forego several L.D.C. markets.
s "Unlike all major countries ... the U.S. generally does not provide special tax arrangements for investments by
American corporations in developing countries. These 'ax-sparing' agreements enable foreign-based companies to
operate with much lower costs than U.S. finns in these emerging markets. The one exception to this U.S. policy is
section 936..." supra note 18.
us RICHARD L DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL, § 5.04(1989); "In sone drcumstances
a foreign country may grant a tax exemption for a period of years or some other special tax concession if a desired
project is being undertaken." JON E. BISCHEL AND ROBERT FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION, 220 (2d ed. 1985); "A foreign country's tax sparing provision has the effect of reducing its tax
on U.S. corporations that invest in the country since the U.S. corporation need not pay the full foreign country tax,
in other words, a part of that tax is 'spared,"' Tax Sparing: A Question of Treasury Policy or Puerto Rico Politics?,
Tax Analysts Tax Notes Int'l, June 3,1987, available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TNI File.
"s DOERNBERG, supra note 156.
'I ld. Mimi E. Gild, Tax Treaty Shopping: Changes in the U.S. Approach to Limitation on Benefits Provisions in
Developing Country Treaties, 30 VA. JINTL L. 553,559 (1990).
'" The competitive advantage is particularly dear when selling drugs directly to consumers in the LD.C.s offering
the tax sparing.
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES -
§ 482 AND § 367(d) TRANSFERS OF INTANGIBLES
One of the hottest tax topics affecting the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is transfer
pricing.160 Although there are incentives and advantages in allowing the allocation of R
& D expenses to U.S. source income, it was feared that after taking advantage of such
deductions, drug companies would simply transfer intangibles tax-free to related foreign
subsidiaries, to be then exploited at lower foreign tax rates. 161 The U.S. circumvented
these practices by enacting §§ 367(d) and § 482.
The I.R.C. § 367(d) provides that an outbound transfer of intangibles for the stock
of a foreign subsidiary in an otherwise tax-free nonrecognition transaction is tobe treated
as a sale of the intangible, with deemed payments contingent on the future profitability
of the intangible.162 "A U.S. corporation exporting technology is therefore treated as if
it had sold the patent to its subsidiary in exchange for deemed royalty payments. 16 The
disincentive presented by § 367(d) is thus that the payments deemed owed on the royalty
may be higher than that which would be agreed upon in an arms-length transaction
between two distinct corporations. 16 However, § 367(d) creates a number of additional
problems for taxpayers.
First, since the deemed payments are treated as U.S. -source income, a U.S.
corporation will incur current U.S. tax but will receive no actual payments
from the foreign subsidiary, which can cause a potential liquidity crunch.
In addition, a substantial risk of double taxation arises, since the foreign
country is imposing tax on the income from the exploitation of the patent
and may disallow a deduction for the deemed royalty payment. If adeduc-
tion is allowed, the country may restrict it to the value of the patent based
upon an arm's length standard at the time of the transfer."6
It appears that these disadvantages are unavoidable if the Treasury must protect U.S.
intangible revenue from being exported tax-free.
11 Although beyond the scope of this article, OBRA '93 § 13236 has recently give § 482 new bite with several
revamped penalty provisions.
"I Peck, supra note 39, at 80.
10 Id.
Ie d.; I.R.C. § 367(d)(2)(A) (1988).
'" Peck, supra note 39, at 80.
' I d.
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One text provides a good illustration of how § 367(d) applies:
[S]uppose X Corp., a U.S. corporation, incurs various research expenses
deductible under I.R.C. §§ 162 or 174 (thereby reducing U.S. source in-
come) in developing a patented pharmaceutical product. Whentheproduct
is commercially feasible, X Corp. transfers the product toY Corp., a wholly-
owned foreign subsidiary in a transaction normally accorded nonrecogni-
tion under I.R.C. § 351. Under I.R.C. § 367(d), X Corp. will have to report
U.S. source ordinary income each year equal to an arm's length royalty.166
Thus, § 367(d) creates a disincentive to the transfer of intangibles by a U.S. pharmaceu-
tical company to its foreign subsidiary corporations for stock under §§ 351 or 361.167
The I.R.C. § 482 allows the IRS the opportunity to reallocate income between
related corporations which transfer intangibles amongst each otherundersales orlicens-
ing agreements (even absent a tax-free exchange for stock).'" The goal of § 482 is to
prevent the understatement of U.S. income through manipulative transfers of intan-
gibles, and require such licensing and sales to be made as if corporations were dealing
with an unrelated party at arm's-length. 169 The § 482 regulations have undergone a
variety of changes as to the correct allocations to be made, with a most recent attempt
being issued on January 13, 1993.170 The application of§ 482, and the Treasury regu-
lations have traditionally been the subject of considerable debate.17,
Because of the research-intensiveness of the industry, and the importance of patent-
ingin thepharmaceutical field, most of the landmark transferpricing cases involved drug
companies. These cases, abstracted below, encompassed a variety of issues, several of
the cases involved U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, and most of them involved
'" DOERNBERG, supra note 156, § 11.02
167 Note: I.R.C. § 367(d) (1988) does not apply to possessions corporations, which are treated as domestic, not
foreign. corporations.
'a I.R.C. § 482 (1988) provides:
In any case of two or more organizations.. owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations ... if he determines that such distribution,
apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such organizations... In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible
property ... the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the
income attributable to the intangible.
16 Peck, supra note 39, at81.
1 0 InternalRevenue Service Temporary Regulations,Intercompany TransferPricing Regulations UnderSection 482
IssuedJan. 13,1993, Daily Report for Executives, Jan. 15,1993,available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File.
I See, e.g., TransferPricing Regs Should be Withdrawn, Says Wiacek, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Int'l, Sept. 23,1992,
available in LEXIS, TAXANA Library, TNI File; see also Pharmaceutical Companies Urge Eliminaiton of Priority
Given to CPIMethod,Tax AnalystsTax Notes nt'l, Aug. 26,1992,available in LEXIS, TAXANALibrary, TNI File.
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the use of possessions corporations." 2 The drug industry has overwhelmingly been
successful in § 482 cases, albeit after protracted litigation. But these cases do illustrate
the friction generated between drug industrialists and the IRS with respect to transfers
between U.S.-located and foreign manufacturing plants.
G.D. Searle & Co. v. CIR
In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner,73 Searle, a U.K. corporation had transferred
many of its valuable drug product lines to SCO, a Puerto Rican subsidiary, under § 351
transactions. 74 Searle assisted SCO in packaging, corporate administration, and regu-
lation compliance, and was paid a fee of 3% of SCO's net sales.175 The IRS sought an
allocation of 92% of SCO's gross income to Searle, representing all profits from the
transferred intangibles.176 However, the Court found SCO itself to be a viable entity, and
its existence and independent ownership of the patents could not be disregarded for tax
purposes."7 Nonetheless, the Tax Court found that some § 482 allocation was appropri-
ate to instate some semblance of arms-length economics, and so allowed an allocation
of 25%.7
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner
In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner,179 Ciba-Geigy, a Swiss corporation, granted
an exclusive license to its U.S. subsidiary to manufacture and sell various herbicides, in
return for a 10% royalty. The IRS argued that the 10% royalty was too high, that 6%
would be appropriate, and that Ciba-Geigy should be subjected to dividend treatment on
the difference.l ° However, petitioner was able to show that other pharmaceutical cor-
'2 As noted above, § 367(d) is not applicable for tax-free transfers of possessions corporations (as, for § 357(d)
purposes, possessions corporations are not considered "foreign" corporations). Therefore, § 482 plays a large role
in technology transfers to Puerto Rican subsidiaries.
17 88 T.C. 252 (1987).
17 Id. at 341.
I" Id. at 256.
176 Id. at 257.
17 Id. at 370.
"7 Id. at 376; Part of the reason for the increased allocation was that the Court disagreed with Searle's "comparable"
transaction evidence of similar product royalties of 8-10%, as the Court found that the licenses at bar were substan-
tially more valuable having been approved by the FDA. See DOERNBERG, supra note 156, § 8.02. See also D. Kevin
Dolan.Intercompany TransferPricingfor the Layman, TAx NTES, Oct. 8,1990, at 221, n. 29, which states that some
commentators have incorrectly suggested that the 25% figure was arrived at by the court using a § 482 profit-split
method.
1- 85T.C. 172 (1985).
1- Id. at 174-75.
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porations were in fact willing to pay higher royalties for such product rights, and so the
Tax Court found that the allocation of the IRS was an abuse of discretion.'5
Merck & Co., Inc. v. United States
The U.S. Claims Court recently decided a § 482 transfer pricing case in favor of the
taxpayer. InMerck & Co. v.UnitedStates,12 the IRS sought a 7% royalty to be allocated
from a Puerto Rican subsidiary (Merck, Sharp & Dome Quimica de Puerto Rico -
MSDQ) back to the U.S. mainland corporation. Merck & Co. had performed all the R
& D on an ingredient called methyldopa, the active ingredient of Aldomet, and had
subsequently contributed exclusive rights to the methyldopa patents to MSDQ under a
tax-free § 351 transaction. 3 The IRS attacked Merck on the theory thatMerck's benefits
in vertical integration, group market planning, and corporate pricing deductions were
intangible assets that ought to be reflected in a royalty. I The real question at bar was
"[hiow far can a U.S. parent corporation go in managing the affairs of a foreign corpo-
ration without subjecting itself to U.S. income tax on a portion of the income of the
foreign subsidiary under Section 482?"' The Courtheld that thebenefits involved were
neither intangible property, nor uncompensated services, and found that a § 482 allocation
was inappropriate.
186
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner,'" Lilly U.S. had developed and patented two
drugs, Darvon and Darvon N, claimed substantial R & D costs, and then transferred the
drug patents, tax free (§ 351), to a Puerto Rican subsidiary.'1 The subsidiary manufac-
tured the drugs, and sold them back to Lilly, who'resold them in the U.S. 89 The IRS
successfully contested on § 482 grounds. 19
"I1 See Dolan, supra note 177, at 217, n. 14. The Court has also been described as creating a rule of thumb that a
license agreement negotiated at arms-length divides net profits between the licensor and licensee at a ratio of 25%
to 75%. See Donald Jankowski, et al., The Transfer ofIntangible Property After the Bausch & Lomb Decision: An
Economic Perspective, TAX NOTES, May 8, 1989.
I' 24 C. CL 73 (1991).10 Robert Feinschreiber, Limiting Intangible and Service Allocations, INT'L TAX I. Summer 1992, at 84.
IU John E. McDermott, Claims Court Holds No482 Change For Group Market Planning and Pricing Policy, 2 J.
INT'L TA'N 314 (Jan./Feb. 1992).
'Is Id.
Im Id. "A taxpayerthat does not take the tax laws into consideration when structuring complex transactions not only
is naive, but probably is out of business. Accordingly, if the allocation is to be justified, it must be on the 'clearly to
reflect income' prong of Section 482." Merck, 24 Cl. Ct. at 85.
"7 84 T.C. 996 (1985), modified 856 E2d 844(7th Cir. 1988).
M Richard J.Driscoll .Income ShifingforlntangiblePropertyTransferredAbroad, 141NT'LTAXJ. 165,175(1988).
' Id.
1' Id. See generally James P. Fuller, Eli Lilly: The Seventh Circuit Partially Reverses the Tax Court, 17:11 TAX
MGmr. INr'L J. 503 (1988).
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In EliLilly, the court resolved the allocation issue by using a profit split method. The
court first allocated to the Puerto Rican subsidiary 100% of the manufacturing costs, and
to the U.S. corporation 100% of the marketing costs. It then determined a 55% to 45%
split of intangible income between the Puerto Rican and U.S. situs, based on the belief
that manufacturing skills were somewhat more contributive to the earnings than were
marketing efforts.' 91
Bausch & Lomb
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner,'92 although not specifically involving a
pharmaceutical corporation, is a § 482 case which had profound implications on the drug
industry, as it also dealt with transferofintangible patent rights to an overseas subsidiary.
Bausch & Lomb, U.S. granted a nonexclusive license to B & L, Ireland to use patented
"spin cast" soft contact lens manufacturing technology.193 Inretum, B &LIreland agreed
topaya5% royalty on sales. TheIRS contested thecharacterizationofthetransaction, arguing
that since B & L U.S. was the primary purchaser of B & L Ireland products, B & L Ireland
should not earn any return from assumed market risk (and consequently unit transfer
prices should be reduced), and further that § 482 should be applied to reallocate a greater
royalty to the U.S. corporation.194 "The Service argued thatthe transferprice and royalty
rate mustbe analyzed together, asserting that B & LIreland was little more than a contract
manufacturer. Further, the Service implied that the cost plus method is the only proper
method fordetermining the price in this transaction."'95 But the Court dealt with transfer
prices and royalty rates separately, stating that each had "independent significance.""'
TheTax Courtfound thatB &Llrland did take on somemarket risk, asB &L, U.S. was
not required to purchase all of B & L, Ireland's inventory.197 However, the Court noted
that the royalty rate provided was far too low, and required the royalty rate to be 20% of
sales, (a rate of return of 27% of B & L Ireland's investment), stating, "Using our best
judgment, we find that at arm's length B & L Ireland would have been willing to invest
in the lens production facility even if required to share approximately 50 percent of the
profits therefrom with B & L as consideration for use of its intangibles."'198 This 15%
increase, based on a 50:50 profit split, has been described as a precursor to the super-
19 Dolan, supra note 177, at 220-21.
" 92T.C. 524, 525 (1989),aft'd, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
' Bausch &Lomb, Inc.v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 1084, 1087 (2d Cir. 1991).
' Dolan, supranote 177 at 218-19.
" Tax Court Upholds Bausch & Lomb's Transfer Prices to Irish Subsidiary, But Royalty Rate is Increasedfrom Five
to Twenty Percent; TAX NOTES, April 3, 1989.
196 Id.
197 id.
'" Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 524, 611 (1989). aft'd, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
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royalty provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, requiring that royalties be "commen-
surate with income."' '
Bausch & Lomb ended up the clear winner of this case, owing only $2.5 million of
the $17 million potentially in dispute." ° As to the transfer pricing issue, the Tax Court
simply found comparable prices in the industry, and looked no further, which was a fatal
blow to the IRS's contract manufacturing pricing theory.201 But the pro-taxpayer B & L
result served to strengthen the IRS's resolve to push for periodic adjustments of royalty
rates.2) Largely because of this, pharmaceutical royalty arrangements are today at risk
of periodic adjustment.
Although, as mentioned, the pharmaceutical companies have been largely success-
ful in their battles with the IRS over § 482 allocations, it's clear that this section's
complexity, volatility, and uncertainty make tax planning and transfers of intangibles
difficult. As can be seen, the IRS largely has a free hand to contest sale prices, licenses
and royalty agreements between related taxpayers. This can be especially difficult for
drug company tax planners when dealing with new drug patents, where the ultimate
market is not always immediately apparent, and any attempt at valuation (for royalty/
price purposes) would be sheer speculation. The pro-litigation stance of the IRS (with
respect to § 482) also makes the conducting of an international business dealing in
intangibles (such as drug patents) more risky than other multinational ventures, as
advantageous transfers between related companies tend to result in lengthy court disputes.
INTERNATIONAL COMPETTIVNESS ISSUES OF THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT, § 28
The Orphan Drug Act of 198310 was designed to provide an additional incentive to
drug companies to conduct research on drugs to fight rare diseases, where the limited
market might not otherwise be sufficient to drive such R & D expenditures.' the Act
tends to be extremely beneficial to U.S. pharmaceutical companies to the detriment of
foreign drug interests (and, perhaps, consumers).
09 Lawrence P. Shanda.Royalties andSuper-royaties 67 TAXES NOTES 576, 577- 78(1989); However. critics note
that the B&Ldecision is inconsistent with results suggested by the then proposed White Paper. Jankowski, supra note
180; See also Daniel J. Frisch, & Thomas Horst, Bausch & Lomb and the White Paper, 43 TAX NOTES, 725 (May
8, 1989), which suggests that the White Paper royalty would be approximately 34%.
" Kathleen MatthewsTaxCourt's Bausch & LombDecisionDealsAnotherBlowtoIRS'TransferPricing Theories,
TAX NOTES, April 3,1989.
Id.
2 Kathleen Matthews, Lainoffand Triplett Respond to Public Comments on Section 482 White Paper, 43 TAX
NOTES, 647 (May, 1989); See also Lee A. Sheppard, Triplett Criticizes Tax Court's Reasoning in Bausch & Lomb,
43 TAX NOTES, 951 (May 22, 1989); "The Bausch & Lomb case is 'a great illustration' of why periodic adjustments'
are needed", Matthews, supra note 200 (quoting Steven R. Lainoff, Associate Chief Counsel (International)).
20 Public Law 97-414,96 Stat. 2049.
2" See Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug.Act; The 'First 7 Years, 265 JAMA 893 (1991).
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The I.R.C. § 28 gives a 50% research expense tax credit to companies who invest
in developing medications (so called "orphan" drugs) for "rare" diseases. A "rare
disease" is defined as one affecting fewer than 200,000 persons in the U.S.2 It was
expected that with such a small market, corporations would not expend time and money
researching these diseases unless government action sweetened the rewards available.
While not explicitly touted as a U.S. sourced company benefit, § 28(d)(3) contains
severe limits on foreign testing. No credit will be allowed for any testing done outside
oftheU.S. unless (i) thereis an insufficient U.S. populationwiththe disease, or(ii) testing
is done outside the U.S. by a U.S. person, or under the auspices of the FDA. 6
The Orphan Drug Act also grants a monopoly of seven years before the FDA will
grant approval of a competing product.' Orphan drug status is granted to products by
the FDA for companies who create qualifying medicines, based on newly clarified
regulations.2 However, high price concerns have recently made Congress rethink this
incentive. Opponents of the Act argue that it allows drug corporations to take advantage
of many of the nation's ailing children.209 In a bill proposed by Senators Kassebaum and
Metzenbaum, a $200 million dollar cap on sales would have been set, after which orphan
drug benefits would terminate.210
It would terminate the 7-year monopoly when a drug reaches $200 million
in sales and allow other drug companies to seek FDA approval of a com-
petitive drug. It will not stop the sale of the first drug, but subject it to price
competition. a $200 million sales trigger will more than cover the cost of
research and development and provide the necessary incentive for compa-
nies to continue working on such drugs.211
I.R.C. § 28(d)(1)(A) (1988). The Code also allows the credit where the disease affects more than 200,000 U.S.
persons fthereis noreasonable expectation ofrecouping R&D expenses outofU.S. sales. I.R.C. § 28(d)(1)(B)(1988).
I.R.C. § 28(d)(3)(A) (1988).
AsbusM supra note 204.
The new FDA regulations, effective January 28, 1993, clarify what degree of difference is required between
existing orphan drugs and newer developments seeking orphan status - generally denying the status to similar drugs
unless "clinical superiority" can be demonstrated. FDA Publishes Orphan Drug Regulations, PR Newswire, Jan. 4,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File; U.S. FDA Sets New Rule for "Orphan" Drug Marketing,
Reuters, Jan. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FINRPT File; This differentiation has already been
criticized as a disincentive to orphan drug development. FDA Draws Heat on Orphan Drug Rules, CREM. WEEM,
Jan. 20, 1993 at 37.
" EndAbuse of the Law on "Orphan" Drugs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 24, 1992, at llA.
21 Orphan Drug Revenue Cap Proposed, INVESTOR, INC: PORFOUO LETrER, June 29, 1992 at 3; David Brown,
Senate to Reconsider Market Shelterfor "Orphan" Drugs, WASH. POST, June 17, 1992, § 1, at A3; Orphan Drugs:
Senate Crte to Vote on Amendmnent Today, Health Line, June 17,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, HLTLNE
File.
255 Anticompetitive Abuse of the Orphan Drug Act: Invitation to High Prices, S. 2060, S. Hrg. 102-615,102d Cong.,
2d Sess., 4 (1992) (Statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) A House version of the bill H.R. 3930 would have set a cap at
$150 million.
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This legislation was initially approved by a Senate Committee in July of 1992.12 How-
ever, drug analysts disagreed with this move, and believed that few companies would
invest the R & D required if such a cap was placed on the incentive.23 Further, loss of
such an incentive which favored U.S. corporations was sure to affect the international
competitiveness of U.S. firms. Pharmaceutical lobbyists and several sympathetic sena-
tors were able to defeat this bill, for the time being, by keeping the legislation from
coming before a vote of the full Senate.214 In the OBRA '93 Act, § 13111 (b) retroactively
amended IRC § 28 and extended the Orphan Drug Act Credit (which had expired June
30, 1992) unchanged through December 31, 1994.215
A RISING TAX RATE - GENERAL COMPETITIVENESS ISSUE
The president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association has suggested that
other countries with interests in promoting their pharmaceutical firms' development
have reduced their corporate tax rates (for such firms) to match that of the U.S. or
below.216 He thus emphasized the need for a stable tax economy, and suggested that a
rate increase would be short-sighted.2 However, with the recent increase of the U.S.
corporate rate to 35%,218 it appears that this will be but another challenge to be faced by
this industry.
20 NewRulesfor "Orphan" Drug Marketing, Pharmaceutical Bus. News, Jan. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, PBNWS File.
211 INVESTOR, INC.; PORTFOUO LEFrER, supra note 209. It appears that the $200,000,000 sales cap is a somewhat
arbitrary amount, and it's not clear that this cap will cover the costs for a drug's development in every situation, let
alone inducemany phannacuticalcorporations to undertake the research involved. Perhaps a capon a specific drug's
net profits, rather than sales, would have been a more sensible approach.
22' DRAKE & UHLMAN, supra note 36, at 43; Metzenbawn to Retire in 1994, Health Legislation and Regulation,
July 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. But the controversy is far from over. "The bill's
principal sponsors, Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R. Kans.) and Howard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio), have informed IBA
that they intend to get this bill enacted in the 103rd Congress." Reginal Rhein, Five Biotech Bills Signed Into Law,
New Congress Ponders Many More, Biotechnology Newswatch, Jan. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File. And new proposals are beginning to surface. In the hopes of circumventing more severe bills such as
the $200 million cap proposal, Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) recently proposed cutting the marketing
exclusivity years for orphan drug status from seven to five years, and allowing the FDA to cut off orphan status if the
patient population increased beyond 200,000 Americans. Reginal Rhein, BIO Circulates Orphan Drug Proposal on
Capital Hill. Biotechnology Newswatch, July 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. However,
this proposal has met with lukewarm enthusiasm in Congress. Id.
223 A Tax Bill Baedeker, A Guide to the 1993 Tax Law, supra note 116, at 876.
226 Mossinghoff, supra note 18; But cf NewLawMayHarm U.S. Investments Overseas, MixedImpact onInvestment
in U.S. Likely, Int'l Trade Reporter, April 1, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTRAD File.
21 Mossinghoff, supra note 18.
22 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L No. 103-66, § 13221 (Increases the corporate rate to 35% for tax
years from January 1, 1993).
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CONCLUSION
At its base level, the opinion of Senator Pryor and his supporters has appeal. They
reason: "We are giving these companies all these tax credits and incentives, and are
getting nothing in return." When one considers that the people hardest hit are America's
aged, Pryor's platform becomes quite a sympathetic one - and one with political
appeal.2 19
But this idea is based on narrow reasoning, and implementation would bring forth
numerous undesired consequences.2  It is not quite clear what these "advocates of
change" hope to accomplish. In answer to the question "What do we get in return," it
should be realized that pharmaceutical companies provide America with one of its most
recession-proof industries, they hire a significant number of employees, find cures for
many diseases, and pay a large portion of U.S. taxes. But it must also be realized that
the ethical drug industry is a business, and like any business, the companies are in it to
make a profit. If they cannot make a profit here, they will likely move elsewhere.
Because of the competitive nature of the world pharmaceutical industry, the U.S.
drug companies need the benefits they are given. This is because other countries give tax
breaks and offer tax sparing opportunities to European and Japanese multinationals that
the U.S. companies cannot take advantage of (as a matter of U.S. law), and also because
of the high degree of speculation involved in drug research. While the Treasury Depart-
ment has in the past opined that companies tend not to be overly influenced by tax factors
when deciding whetherto relocate researchoperations overseas, it is possible that enough
adverse tax law may change the drug industry's perspective. When it offered this
opinion, theTreasury Department was speaking only aboutthe R & D expense allocation
regulations. The inherent tax costs were found not to be a location-determining factor,
as foreign start-up costs tended to be too prohibitive to permit a move solely to protect
a credit which accounted for only an estimated 1% of U.S. research expenses.2' But if
one adds to that a higher corporate tax rate, a loss of use of the § 936 Possessions Tax
Credit, restrictive transfer pricing regulations, a limiting of applicability of the Orphan
Drug Act, and less favorable patent laws and FDA regulations, tax havens, such as
Ireland, suddenly become more appealing. Itis therefore possible that theTreasury may
2'9 This is especially true since, although prescription drugs accountforonly 5¢ of every dollar, itis the 5€mostlikely
to be paid directly by consuners, a.k.a. constituents. "[O]nly 5 percent of hospital costs are paid out-of-pocket in the
United States. However, over 70 percent of prescription drug costs in the United States are paid oitt-of-pockeL" A
STATUS REPORT: ACCESSIBILITY AND AFIMRDABILITY OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FOR OLDR AMERICANS,
supra note 29, at 1. "'People don't like drug companies. They are far more attuned to the price of a drug than to the
cost of a hospital room because most people don't pay for a hospital room but many pay for drugs out of pockeL"'
Kathleen Day,.The Drug Industry's Response; Lobbyists Tackling Rising Criticism, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1993, at
C-I (quoting drug analyst Marc O. Mayer).
2" Such as fewer drug innovations, a loss of jobs, and the possible emigration of some portions of the industry.
Dl But cf ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., supra note 72.
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have to rethink its position. President Clinton and Senator Pryor may be about to "kill
the goose that lays the golden eggs."tm1
However, the drug companies ought to be prepared to compromise somewhat, as
their bargaining chips are quickly being knocked off the table. It is possible that a give-
away of one benefit in exchange for preserving another may be in their best interests in
the future. Perhaps, a counter proposal to Clinton's R & D - Royalty Plan, with, for
example, an 80% R & D credit in exchange for some percentage (i.e. 20%) of active
royalties being placed into the passive limitation "basket," would have been acceptable.
And it probably would have been prudent for the drug industry to whole-heartedly back
a position such as Congressman Rostenkowski's relatively minor 15% Possessions
Credit reduction bill, rather than have protested all limitations. Following the expiration
of the temporary OBRA '93 expense allocation provisions, the industry should proffer
some fomi of counter-proposal that the Clinton administration might agree to accept.
Claiming "loss of dollars means loss of research" tends to fall on deaf ears, as the public
and many Congressmen appear only to have a vague idea of what biomedical research
is all about.tm
m "[mhe international competitiveness of U.S. companies in high technology industries is influenced by a variety
of provisions of the Code. While the R&D allocation rules may disadvantage U.S. companies relative to their foreign
competitors, other provisions of the Code ... may offset this disadvantage." TaxPamphlet, supra note 55. Yet while
it appears that one can attack any one advantage given to this industry without making it unprofitable for them to do
business here, it's not clearthat the threshold won't be met when politicians attack various Code sections successively,
as has now been proposed... (Note: this "killing the goose" language was first argued in 1991 during the debate
of Senator Pryor's unsuccessful "Prescription Drug Cost Containment Act." Pryor still questions this assertion.
PharmaceuticalIndustry, GoodMedicineforMadison Avenue, 138 CONG. REC. S. 7529,7530,102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(daily ed.. March 26, 1992) (statement of Sen. Pryor)).
2" See supra note 11.
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